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Abstract 
 
This purpose of this study is to provide a greater understanding and awareness 
of the existence of state-sanctioned torture that is being committed in 
Uzbekistan. 
In the early chapters, the definitions, meanings and understanding of what 
torture is and represents in a contemporary society are investigated, whilst the 
historical origins, uses and justifications for torture are also explored. 
Following this, the main case study, Uzbekistan, is formally introduced. Torture 
in Uzbekistan is endemic, and wholly supported by its authoritarian government. 
This study investigates why that is the case; Chapter 3 in particular critically 
examines Uzbek domestic law to determine its current legal position, and 
compares this stance with the international provisions relating to torture.  
This study also investigates the instances of torture in both Europe and Latin 
America, in order to draw similar comparisons with Uzbekistan, and to provide 
contextualisation. This involves examining key cases such as Ireland v UK, 
Tomasi v France and Selmouni v France. The conclusions drawn from the 
European legal landscape illustrate that torture is very much the exception 
rather than the norm, and that through clear precedent and rigorous protection 
of both Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Article 5 of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as relevant domestic law, 
European judges are well-placed to make torture a thankfully rare occurrence. 
Latin America is exposed in Chapter 5 as having had a more problematic and 
legally concerning history of torture; in particular the dictatorships of Pinochet of 
Chile, Peron of Argentina, and Branco of Brazil during the 1960s, 1970s and 
1980s. These regimes and the torture that was authorised under the command 
of these leaders are contrasted with that of former President Karimov of 
Uzbekistan, who ruled from 1992 to 2016. The leaders of these nations have 
trodden similar paths with regard to state-sanctioned torture, and again, provide 
relevant contextualisation and precedent for Uzbekistan to be compared to. 
The difficulty Uzbekistan faces with its history of torture is then addressed in the 
closing chapters of this thesis, and questions are raised about its likely future 
occurrence and potential reforms, which may serve to limit or prevent this. 
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Chapter 1 
Context, Aims, and Methodology 
 
Until recently, torture has arguably been a much neglected subject.1 Society 
thinks it knows what it is, and it thinks it understands the rationale behind it – in 
simplest terms, it is a tool to extract information which may otherwise be 
unattainable through less drastic means. It may also be understood as simply a 
cruel and nasty punishment for the sake of punishment, or a way of one 
individual, group, organisation or state government displaying power and control 
over another group of individual group, or the citizens of a certain state, in order 
to make an example or to serve as a deterrent. 
Many, most likely the majority, perceive it as a crime. For example, when 
referring to American citizens, Biswas and Zalloua reveal that ‘a mere 15 
percent’2 support its use. Often perceived as an archaic, medieval practice that 
has no place in twenty-first century society, torture certainly has its critics. 
However, in certain parts of the world, it has considerable support.   
Almost no state is exempt from its employment; at some point in history, no 
matter where you look, chances are torture has been utilised by the state or 
those asking under its authority. Writing in 1908, long before the United Nations 
was formed and an international prohibition of torture was enacted, Emil Reich 
observes that ‘In some countries the use of torture as a means of discovering 
truth in criminal matters was not forbidden before well in the nineteenth 
century’.3  
However, before moving on to the main subject in question, it is appropriate to 
give a brief historical introduction to the origins of torture over time in order to 
give some greater context and lay the foundations for the analysis that is to 
come. 
                                                          
1
 Post 9/11, there has been a significant amount of academic debate and associated publications 
concerning torture and the legal and practical issues relating to its use. 
2
 Shampa Biswas and Zahi Anbra Zalloua, Torture:  Power, Democracy, and the Human Body’ (Whitman 
College 2011) 41. 
3
 Emil Reich, General History of Western Nations from 5000 B.C. to 1900 A.D. (Macmillan and Company 
Limited 1908) 252. 
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History of Torture 
In terms of states, Spain is an appropriate choice for use as an opening 
example. During the middle-ages, torture was the infamous tool of the Spanish 
Inquisition used to strike fear into the hearts of the heretics and blasphemers; 
although, it was not used so nearly as often as commonly believed – its 
abundant use being a popular misconception:  
The Inquisition, like other courts under the Ancien Regime, 
resorted to the torture of prisoners to make them confess, but it 
did so far less than other courts, not out of humanity or 
repugnance for such methods, but simply because it reckoned 
to the procedure to be fallible and inefficient. 90 per cent of the 
accused brought before the Inquisition were never subjected to 
torture.4 
In England, it was used as both an early method of intelligence gathering5 and 
also a vengeful punishment on the behalf of the Crown toward Guy Fawkes as 
a result of the failed treasonous Gunpowder Plot of 1605. This has later been 
described as one of the first documented terrorist attacks on English soil, as 
Fawkes and his fellow conspirators attempted to oust Protestant rule in favour 
of Catholicism; ‘Like many terrorists throughout history, Fawkes and his 
colleagues justified their actions in terms of religion’.6 
There also needs to be an outline as to why torture has been used for so long; 
the ever changing justifications for its use need clarifying. 
Reasons for Torture 
In the middle-ages, torture was used more as a punishment and deterrent, 
much like prison sentences are used now for a similar purpose. As Luban 
observes, ‘Until the last two centuries torture was used as a form of criminal 
punishment’.7 There was much less of an intelligence gathering objective than 
is the case today. Despite this being the case, Brecher argues that using torture 
                                                          
4
 Joseph Perez, The Spanish Inquisition – A History (Profile Books 2004) 148. 
5
 Larissa Tracy, Torture and Brutality in Medieval Literature: Negotiations of National Identity (D.S. 
Brewer Cambridge) 10. 
6
 Sue Mahan and Pamala L. Griset, Terrorism in Perspective (SAGE Publications Inc. 2013) 43. 
7
David Luban, The Torture Debate in America: Liberalism, Torture, and The Ticking Bomb (Cambridge 
University Press 2006) 40. 
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as a means of gleaning state secrets is essentially useless, especially in 
reference to the ticking bomb scenario:8  
There is scant evidence that torture can work to produce timely 
and reliable ticking bomb intelligence… this does not provide a 
strong evidential base for arguing that torture is likely to 
produce the intelligence necessary to prevent a terrorist attack 
in time-limited circumstances.9 
In the modern world, the ways of gathering evidence have evolved, which have 
had a direct effect of making it increasingly difficult in many instances to prove 
that torture has actually been used. As accountability becomes more important 
and information gathering powers become more refined, if a state is determined 
to employ torture, then it is likely to convert from using physiological torture 
methods to psychological. The subtlety of some forms of torture now makes it 
harder to garner evidence of its use; physical torture, for example, often leaves 
identifiable scars on the victim, but if an individual has been tortured via more 
psychological means, evidence is harder to collect. This issue was discussed 
when Gerrity and others investigated the rarely considered social and economic 
consequences for the victims of torture and explained the risks of physical and 
psychological torture effects: 
Physical disability may arise from permanent bodily injury 
(Skylv, 1992) or head trauma leading to cognitive impairment. 
Psychological problems, including PTSD and depression, may 
cause significant social disability and undermine the chances of 
finding employment.  
They further go on to explain the impact on families and relationships that 
torture can indelibly leave: 
Irritability and rage reactions may impair interpersonal 
relationships. Marital and family problems may occur because 
of the inability to feel intimacy or to re-establish trust. Memory 
and concentration difficulties may reduce the capacity for 
learning and impair work performance. Symptoms of impulsivity 
may lead to problems with the law.10 
                                                          
8Boď BƌeĐheƌ, ͚Torture and the Ticking Bomb (Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2007) 1. 
9
Philip Rumney, Torturing Terrorists, Exploring the Limits of Law, Human Rights and Academic Freedom 
(Routledge 2015) 78. 
10
Ellen Gerrity, Terence M. Keane and Farris Tuma, The Mental Health Consequences of Torture (Kluwer 
Academic/Plenum Publishers 2001) Chp 3. 
11 
 
Physical torture has often been proven to actually provoke defiance from the 
victim, rather than compliance,11 whereas more delicate techniques are 
documented as being more successful. Gerrity and others, whilst referring to 
this, mention the KUBARK manual. This was an American codified interrogation 
technique manual detailing CIA research into ‘no-touch’ torture, or psychological 
torture methods developed in the 1960s.12 Indeed, they submit that: 
Use of force is a poor technique, yields unreliable results, may 
damage subsequent collection efforts, and can induce the 
source to say what he thinks the interrogator wants to hear. 
…both CIA manuals detail the use of psychological techniques 
and physical coercion that can be used to obtain intelligence… 
Often even the threat of torture alone will evoke cooperation… 
The KUBARK manual states that threats could be ‘worse than 
useless’ although there is evidence that detainee threats or 
threats against family members can illicit information.13  
In the United States, as recently as 2014, details have emerged concerning the 
Bush administration’s post 9/11 use of torture and coercive interrogation, with 
evidence revealing that suspects held in Guantanamo Bay were repeatedly 
waterboarded14 and subjected to degrading and inhumane treatment, it being 
claimed that these practices produced vital intelligence which helped to protect 
the US and other countries against terrorist attacks.15 This admission of 
accountability was made by former President Barack Obama in August 2014, 
yet no apparent reference to torture as an international crime was made. This 
could perceivably be interpreted, albeit without sound evidence, that torture is 
still not being taken seriously as a crime, and that international laws on its 
prohibition are inadequate. Or rather, it is being taken seriously, but the problem 
could be that the state in mention may likely blame non-state actors for the 
                                                          
11
 IaŶ Leslie, ͚The LoŶg ‘ead: The sĐieŶtists peƌsuadiŶg teƌƌoƌists to spill theiƌ seĐƌets͛ ;The GuaƌdiaŶ, 
13/10/17) <https://www.theguardian.com/news/2017/oct/13/the-scientists-persuading-terrorists-to-
spill-their-secrets?CMP=share_btn_link> accessed 20
th
 October 2017. 
12
 Alfred W. McCoy, A Question of Torture: CIA Interrogation, From the Cold War to the War on Terror 
(Holt Paperback 2006) 10. 
13
ibid 90. 
14
 This is a physical interrogation technique which typically involves the suspect to be tied down on to a 
taďle. The iŶteƌƌogatoƌ;sͿ theŶ plaĐe a Đloth oǀeƌ the suspeĐt͛s ŵouth aŶd theŶ pouƌ a laƌge ǀoluŵe of 
water over the cloth at several time intervals. The suspect receives the sensation of drowning, but is 
generally not put in actual danger of death. 
15
 Alfred W. McCoy, Torture and Impunity: The U.S. Doctrine of Coercive Interrogation (University of 
Wisconsin Press 2012) 159. 
12 
 
allegations but attempt to hide actual state-accountability for torture. As 
Amnesty International suggested;  
The fact that President Obama not only ended the CIA secret 
detention program, but has also publicly acknowledged that 
torture was a part of it, is to be welcomed. Nevertheless, the 
President once again failed to say that torture is a crime under 
international law, that every instance must be subjected to 
investigation and that anyone responsible for it must be brought 
to justice.  
Amnesty goes on to explain the problems that the US still faces regarding the 
hard truth of the matter that it has tortured; 
President Obama’s silence on accountability and redress 
reflects the USA’s continuing and active failure to meet its 
international human rights obligations on these issues.16 
President Trump, in the infancy of his administration in January 2017, 
personally spoke on the issue of US-led torture, and contrary to what Obama 
suggested in 2014, explained that America needed to continue using 
techniques such as waterboarding against Islamist terrorists in order for there to 
be ‘an even field’.17 These comments suggest a dangerous slip back into the 
torture-tainted past that the US was only just beginning to come to terms with 
and attempt to move on from. This space will need to be observed very closely 
as Trump’s presidency evolves over the next four years. 
Regardless of how effective international law is on controlling the use of torture 
by states worldwide, and that these given examples are just the tip of the 
iceberg when it comes to examining the dark histories of state involvement in 
committing torture, one thing does seem clear; In the Western world (North 
America, Western and Central Europe), the authorities are by no means 
innocent in terms of their activities but at least there is some effort made on 
their part to explain past actions. 
                                                          
16
 AŵŶestǇ IŶteƌŶatioŶal, ͚U“A:  ͚We Toƌtuƌed “oŵe Folks͛:  The Wait Foƌ Tƌuth, ‘eŵedǇ aŶd 
Accountability CoŶtiŶues As ‘edaĐtioŶ Issue DelaǇs ‘elease of “eŶate ‘epoƌt oŶ CIA DeteŶtioŶs͛ 
(Amnesty International, 2
nd
 September 2014, Index Number AMR 51/046/2014 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/AMR51/046/2014/en/. 
17
 Mattheǁ Weaǀeƌ aŶd “peŶĐeƌ AĐkeƌŵaŶ, ͚Tƌuŵp Đlaiŵs toƌtuƌe ǁoƌks ďut eǆpeƌts ǁaƌŶ of its 
͚poteŶtiallǇ eǆisteŶtial͛ Đosts ;The GuaƌdiaŶ, Ϯϲ/Ϭϭ/ϭϳͿ < https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2017/jan/26/donald-trump-torture-absolutely-works-says-us-president-in-first-television-
interview> accessed 24
th
 October 2017. 
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However, one individual state stands out from this crowd in several ways. 
Despite being a signatory to the 1984 United Nations Convention against 
Torture18 it has become renowned amongst several leading human rights 
organisations and the governments of many first world countries for its 
relentless and systematic use of torture in various aspects of its criminal justice 
system. This state does not employ torture secretively. It has a national agenda 
built around it, as though intertwined in its constitutional values and identity. The 
state being referred to here is Uzbekistan. 
19Chart 1.1: This bar chart shows the 
number of signatories to the United Nations 
Convention against Torture still committing 
acts of torture inside their borders.  Out of the 
155 UNCAT signatories, 79 are still torturing 
according to Amnesty International, over the 
32 years since its inception. 
The Situation of Uzbekistan 
‘Torture is endemic in Uzbekistan’s criminal justice system…’20  
Amnesty International 2015 
Located in Central Asia, neighboured by five states including Kazakhstan and 
Afghanistan, Uzbekistan is a mid-sized nation relative to its surrounding area. 
From 1924 to 1991, it was merged into the Soviet Bloc and was incorporated 
into the USSR. It has a population of just over 31 million, making it the 42nd 
most populous nation in the world. Geographically, it is situated at a crossroads, 
with Eastern Europe to the west, Russia to the north, and China to the east.   
It is also a nation that is notorious for its regular use of torture on prisoners and 
suspects in detention; this having been repeatedly highlighted by several 
leading human rights organisations in recent times, some of the most 
noteworthy of these being Human Rights Watch (HRW) and Amnesty 
                                                          
18
 As of September 1995. 
19
 Chart 1.1: Bar chart comparing signatories to the UNCAT with signatories committing torture. 
20
 Amnesty International, Secrets and Lies:  Forces Confessions Under Torture in Uzbekistan (Stop Torture 
Campaign Report, Index EUR 62/1086/2015) 8. 
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International. For example, in May 2015, HRW used these words to open its 
damning report entitled ‘Uzbekistan – A Call for Human Rights Council Action’: 
Despite appearing only rarely in global headlines, Uzbekistan’s 
atrocious human rights record requires an urgent and 
coordinated international response. Its authoritarian 
government severly limits freedom of expression, assembly, 
association, and religion; has imprisoned thousands on 
politically motivated charges; and continues to wage an 
unrelenting crackdown on human rights work, independent 
journalism, peaceful opposition, and civic activity. Torture in 
Uzbekistan is widespread and systematic.21   
The ongoing concern that is Uzbekistan’s treatment of its nationals is bad 
enough, but what further intensifies the situation is the fact that is appears to 
act, to the outside world at least, in good faith, and seemingly complies with 
prohibitions on torture, paying hypocritical lip-service to the international 
community. It has, of late, been keen to emphasise its efforts at reform, namely 
its ‘engagement with the United Nations anti-torture machinery, which resulted 
in several legal reforms’.22 This is coupled with the Uzbek ‘government’s 
strenuous efforts to convince the international community that it is committed to 
torture reform, while acknowledging neither the scale nor the impunity for it’.23   
A detailed analysis of the torture methods Uzbekistan uses on its prisoners will 
be explored in later chapters of this thesis, which will be accompanied by a 
closer look at its continuing hypocrisy which critically contrasts this behaviour 
with its positive UN engagement and signing of several international anti-torture 
charters, as well as attempts to modify its own national criminal code at the 
behest of UN recommendations. This brings about another wider issue which 
boils down to the effectiveness of the enforcement capabilities of international 
law in general, of which they are arguably ineffective. The central focus will be 
the assessment of whether international law is effectively controlling 
Uzbekistan’s breach of basic human rights laws; if not, then perhaps an 
overhaul of its national laws would be more beneficial, possibly in the form of a 
                                                          
21
 Human Rights Watch, Uzbekistan – A Call for Human Rights Council Action (May 2015) 3. 
22
Human Rights Watch, Nowhere to Turn – Torture and ill-treatment in Uzbekistan (November 2007, 
Volume 19, No. 6(D)) 7. 
23
 ibid 7. 
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new torture statute or the creation of new national human rights institutions 
(NHRIs). 
Aims 
The principal aim of this thesis is to put forward an argument for a national, 
codified and entrenched torture statute for the sovereign state of Uzbekistan, 
and to justify the incorporation of this statute into Uzbekistan’s domestic law, 
with its provisions being applied to the country’s criminal justice system. 
During the subsequent chapters of this thesis, the current condition of 
Uzbekistan’s legal system will be critically analysed, with particular focus on its 
attitude toward basic and intrinsic human rights which are, from an international 
perspective at least, understood to be one of the core legal guarantees for all 
human beings.   
There will also be a comparison between Uzbekistan’s attitude towards human 
rights and its compatibility with the relevant statutes regarding such rights, 
which in turn will be compared with a variety of other states, some of which are 
prosperous and westernised and which seek to safeguard such rights, including 
Western European nations, and some of which are more closely related to 
Uzbekistan in terms of their economic, social, geographical and cultural 
parallels. These include nations within Uzbekistan’s surrounding area, such as 
Kazakhstan, and also past regimes with a history of torture in more remote 
nations, such as Chile under the infamous Pinochet regime of the 1970s and 
1980s. There will also be a study of nations which have reformed their use of 
torture somewhat for a variety of reasons, such as international pressure or 
state compromise.  
In addition, there will be careful consideration of what monitoring systems are 
currently in place and embedded within the constitutions and legal frameworks 
of such states in order to gain a better understanding of what legal incentives 
are present to ensure the highest possible level of state compliance with black 
letter law, and to safeguard against potential infringements of such law.   
As part of this study, there will be a critical discussion of the term ‘torture’ and 
its definition under domestic and international law, and engagement with a 
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number of the key debates present in this field. There is a significant element of 
ambiguity worldwide as to the appropriate definition of torture (notwithstanding 
the existence of the various international law measures), and so there will be an 
assessment of many examples contained in case law, particularly European, 
whereby the goalposts of what actually constitutes committing the crime of 
torture have been shifted and arguably blurred due to different decisions 
interpreting breaches of the law in different ways. For instance, the difference 
between ‘torture’ and ‘inhuman and degrading treatment’ is seen as significant 
by certain judges, despite the fact that the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union, explicitly Article 4, makes no such distinction. Any action 
which could be described as inhuman treatment towards a fellow human being 
is enough to constitute a breach of European law. 
Moving on to ECHR law, a prime example of this is Ireland v UK24 which took 
place during ‘The Troubles’. Several IRA members conducted acts of terrorism 
in the UK, and were subsequently arrested by British police. During their 
internment, the IRA suspects were repeatedly subjected to several punishments 
which could be considered inhuman and degrading, including being hooded, 
placed in stress positions against a wall for hours at a time, and food 
deprivation. The Irish government claimed that these punishment techniques 
breached Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights; the 
prohibition of torture.   
It was held that such techniques used were premeditated, and that although not 
deemed severe enough to constitute torture, the mental and physical effects 
suffered as a result were enough to breach Article 3. The Court also made a 
point of distinguishing torture from inhuman treatment, by ruling that torture was 
‘deliberate inhuman treatment causing very serious and cruel suffering’. 
Applying this test, it held that neither the use in interrogation of the ‘five 
techniques’ nor the physical assaults that had occurred in that case were 
torture.25   
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This distinction is important. Looking at it from the perspective of this ruling, 
rather than seeing inhuman treatment as a grade down from torture, it instead 
portrays torture as a grade above inhuman treatment – or rather, inhuman 
treatment and something extra – the very serious and cruel suffering. This case 
demonstrates how brittle Article 3 of the ECHR can be – you do not need to 
torture someone to breach its provisions; rather it is more like a spectrum of 
mental and physical pain or suffering, and landing anywhere in the spectrum is 
likely to constitute a violation of the law.26 
In later chapters of this study, there will be further discussion of the separation, 
or rather categorisation, of the assumed various gradations of torture law 
breach. This explanation will be used as a basis to argue and reason that there 
is a distinct difference in the ways in which international, or supra-national, 
organisations such as the United Nations and the European Union interpret 
laws on torture as compared to domestic laws of individual states, such as the 
United Kingdom’s Human Rights Act 1998, and the American Convention on 
Human Rights 1969. 
Methodology 
The various sources used and referred to in this thesis will be a combination of 
case law, national statute law, international charters and conventions, legal 
journal articles, textbooks and monographs, reports, websites and also various 
magazine and newspaper articles, where relevant. These sources may either 
complement or negate each other during the process. This type of situation is 
valued, as it promotes debate between conflicting ideas and opinions on how 
torture is viewed by different scholars, academics and jurors, and from there, a 
more reasoned answer to the growing problem of Uzbekistan’s use of torture 
may be drawn. There must also be an understanding as to the levels of bias 
which are possible.  
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Chapter 2   
What is Torture? 
 
Admittedly the word "torture" included in Article 3 of the Convention is not 
capable of an exact and comprehensive definition.27 
Opinion of Judge M. Zekia in Ireland v United Kingdom (1978) 
 
Before examining the intricacies of the flaws present within the system of 
human rights protection in place in Uzbekistan, its legal framework, treatment of 
suspects, comparisons with neighbouring and contrasting systems worldwide, 
and also the possible remedies to any identified deficiencies, it is important to 
establish a definition of the focal subject matter. Torture, for legal purposes, 
should be defined. Moreover, is comprehensively defining such a term an 
achievable aim? 
From many perspectives, notably a lawyer’s amongst others, torture is a 
deceptively ambiguous term, the interpretation of which depends on who is 
asked. Torture can take many forms; it is useful to establish which of those 
forms are culturally most recognisable. Perhaps, a hooded victim in a cellar with 
a hot poker being applied to his chest by a masked assailant? A peasant having 
his limbs slowly ripped apart by the wooden rack in a medieval dungeon? Or 
even a more recent approach, such as one seen in modern fictional film and 
television adaptations created purely for entertainment purposes; perhaps the 
sight of 24’s Jack Bauer injecting a would-be Iranian bomber with pain-inducing 
chemicals on the behalf of the fictitious Counter Terrorist Unit to discover some 
critical information so that he can save the day before it is too late. 
In relation to this, Green compares the way in which torture is presented to us 
on screen with reality, before giving a frank assessment of how he identifies 
with torture: 
It is often noted that torture goes against the tenets of human community 
in two fundamental ways. Because torturers deny the basic humanity of 
their victims, it’s a violation of the norms governing everyday society. At 
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the same time, torture constitutes society’s ultimate perversion, shaking 
or breaking its victims’ faith in humanity by turning their bodies and their 
deepest commitments – political or spiritual belief, love of family – against 
them to produce pain and fear.28 
Many people will have their own notion of torture which is akin to that of others, 
but rarely identical. Herein lies a significant legal conundrum – if there is no 
universally and internationally accepted legal standard for what represents 
torture, then it needs to be established how individual state’s legal systems 
apply the law in a uniform manner in order to prevent its use. Arguably, this in 
itself opens the possibility of a breeding ground for national states to stretch and 
uniquely interpret such laws in order to fit their own needs, as can be 
demonstrated with Uzbekistan.  
This fundamental issue of the lack of universal understanding of what actually 
constitutes torture is something which international law has tried to correct since 
the second half of the twentieth century, but has thus far been arguably 
unsuccessful. Before analysing the failings of the ways in which supra-national 
bodies and the various conventions ascribed to them handle the definition of 
torture, there must firstly be a succinct examination of the main definitions which 
are the most well-known worldwide.   
General definitions of torture 
Initially, a standard dictionary definition is probably the one source that the 
average man would turn to if they were asked to provide an accurate meaning 
of the word.  The Oxford English dictionary provides three definitions; 
1. The infliction of severe bodily pain, as punishment or a means of 
persuasion; spec. judicial torture, inflicted by a judicial or quasi-judicial 
authority, for the purpose of forcing an accused or suspected person to 
confess, or an unwilling witness to give evidence or information 
2. Severe or excruciating pain or suffering (of body and mind); anguish, 
agony, torment; the infliction of such 
3. Severe pressure; violent perversion or ‘wresting’; violent action or 
operation; severe testing or examination.29 
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The first definition conveys some understanding as to why certain states employ 
torture in order to obtain information from suspected criminals; in essence, it is 
often a way of extracting either often vital evidence, a full confession, or both. 
However, as is the case in many circumstances involving this course of action, 
the evidence and confession given by the victim is often false, or at least not 
entirely accurate, as the desperation to end the suffering can lead to the 
provision of false information.  
A recent extract given by O’Mara in Why Torture Doesn’t Work – The 
Neuroscience of Interrogation30 expands on this as analysed by Elliott in New 
Scientist magazine, under the heading; ‘Torture doesn’t work, says science: 
Why are we still doing it?’  Commenting on O’Mara’s text, Elliott states;  
If you torture the data long enough, the saying goes, it will confess to 
anything.  Although this is a problem for scientists, the stakes are higher 
for torturers.  If tortured people really will tell you anything, how do you 
know when they are telling the truth?31   
He then goes on to explain the view that torture is far more ineffective than is 
often claimed, paraphrasing O’Mara’s publication, he notes:  
Interrogators often escalate torture when they think a suspect is 
withholding information or lying, but there is no good evidence that 
interrogators are better than the rest of us at detecting lies. In fact, there 
is evidence that when people are trained as interrogators, they become 
more likely to think others are lying to them. This belief can lead to 
alarming errors, whereby people are tortured because their torturer 
wrongly believes they are lying. New technologies to detect lies do not 
work either, says O’Mara.32   
This shines torture in an ever worsening light. When at one stage, those who 
justified torture pointed to the value of, and speed in which results can be 
gathered, O’Mara successfully counters the arguments justifying torture with 
measurable, accurate quantitative evidence denoting the exact opposite.  
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Justifying Torture: The Ticking-Bomb Hypothetical 
These revelations bring into debate the often referred to argument that torture is 
a necessity in certain extreme situations, such as the ‘ticking time bomb’ 
scenario where a suspect is believed to have critical knowledge of an imminent 
mass scale terror attack capable of inflicting large scale casualties on civilians, 
and there is a limited window of opportunity to collect such knowledge. 
Defenders of torture often use this as justification for using enhanced and illegal 
interrogation techniques on terror suspects because there is no time to go down 
a more ethical and morally acceptable route.33 Philip Heymann, the former US 
Deputy Attorney-General, is quoted in Why Terrorism Works by Dershowitz as 
stating; ‘Authorizing torture is a bad and dangerous idea that can easily be 
made to sound plausible. There is a subtle fallacy embedded in the traditional 
‘ticking bomb’ argument for torture to save lives’.34 Heymann appears to see it 
as a way of falsely justifying torture by hiding its use behind a mask of assumed 
necessity; essentially an excuse which is ultimately scattered with flaws and 
untested suppositions. 
Mendez and Schulz are also critical of the scenario’s justification, stating that:  
Proponents of ticking bomb torture try to convince us that the calculation 
is straightforward: torture one terrorist, save 100 people. But that 
assumes that there are no further detrimental consequences once the 
victims of the bombing are saved – no retaliatory strikes, for example, by 
the torture victim’s comrades to pay back the inhumanity done their 
brother. If that happens, the math may quickly change: 100 people saved 
today; 1,000 killed tomorrow.35 
The point they are making is often either overlooked or neglected by ticking-
bomb proponents, but it is a crucial flaw which should be used as a clear 
warning and deterrent against those who defend torture in such circumstances. 
A more detailed examination of what the main definitions of torture are 
worldwide, and the extent of state subscriptions to these definitions can now be 
undertaken.   
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Legal and Academic Definitions 
An official dictionary definition is an appropriate starting point for a popular 
understanding as to what torture means, but for the purposes of this study there 
needs to be clarity as to how individual states interpret the meaning of the word, 
and how this informs practice within their legal systems.   
Similarly in part with the dictionary definition, the UN Convention against Torture 
and Other Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, which is legally 
binding upon its signatories, defines torture as: 
any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is 
intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him 
or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he 
or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or 
intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on 
discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at 
the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official 
or other person acting in an official capacity.36 
This definition notes that torture can be defined as such for either means of 
punishment or obtaining information.  
Basoglu, and quoting Mangakis, gives the view that torture is complex and not 
easy to summarise in a sentence or two; rather it is an amalgamation of several 
proportions, and he also draws on the significance of state involvement: 
Torture is a complex, multi-dimensional act, and these 
dimensions are mirrored in the torture definition’s requirements 
of intention, purpose (or discrimination), “severe pain or 
suffering” of whatever kind, and official involvement. When they 
all come together, the atrocity that is torture is committed.37 
He also explains that: 
…it is never easy nor cheap to torture – and the definition 
expands on this: torture has a perpetrator and a victim, as well 
as a third “entity” – the state in all its might – on hand to 
facilitate, order, commit, or tolerate.38 
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This gives the impression that state-sponsored torture has several guises, yet in 
essence, there is no great difference between the state either allowing, or 
actively involving itself in carrying out torture. The distinction is there, but 
ultimately it all comes under the same definition. 
There is also the question as to whether the current legal definitions of torture 
are adequate, or perhaps they need refreshing over time; in essence, the 
evolving nature of the beast. Laws need to steadily evolve to reflect society’s 
changing priorities. Basoglu also addresses this matter, and has the opinion 
that the differing reactions to torture worldwide necessitate the means for it to 
have different definitions, which is in direct contrast to the accepted international 
definitions and prohibitions. ‘A commonly recognised definition of torture does 
not exist because torture has many unique forms and cultural meanings in 
different geopolitical regions’.39 
Basoglu appears to be going against the grain here, because clear legal 
prohibitions of torture indeed exist and are meant to be treated as universal, 
rejecting the diverse nature of torture that he describes. He is giving credence 
to the argument that there is a division between universalism, which 
encompasses the international laws on torture, and cultural relativism, which in 
this case covers domestic laws which are not entirely compatible with the 
international versions. 
One such example of this could be the Cairo Declaration of Human Rights in 
Islam40, (of which Uzbekistan is a signatory)41 which while having very strong 
similarities with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, differs in some 
areas due to the cultural uniqueness of Islam and Shari’ah law influencing the 
wording and interpretation of certain provisions. These cultural differences can 
be contrasted with the arguably western, more secular nature of the UN’s 
equivalent laws.  
Indeed, in 1981, the Iranian representative to the UN, Said Rajaie-Khorassani 
expressed that in contrast to the CDHRI, the ‘UNDHR was "a secular 
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understanding of the Judeo-Christian tradition", which could not be implemented 
by Muslims without trespassing the Islamic law.’42 In respect to Basoglu, he has 
correctly addressed the fact that in some aspects, human rights are interpreted 
by some as having differing cultural flavours rather than universal meaning. 
Nevertheless, Uzbekistan is incorporated by both the UNDHR and CDHRI, and 
so there should be enough compatibility between the two for a state which is a 
signatory to both to be able to follow the relevant provisions without significant 
conflict. However, there does appear to be an element of hypocrisy, or at least 
confusion, if Uzbekistan can adhere to and align itself with Shari’ah law on the 
one hand, and also appear to follow western legal interpretations on the other. 
Uzbekistan itself adds fuel to the fire of the ‘universalism versus cultural 
relativism’ debate, given its hybrid approach to international treaties and 
conventions, yet ultimately, ignores the laws of both in its continuation of 
sanctioning state-sponsored torture. 
It is now necessary to give some background on what these key international 
torture prohibitions are, and also start framing the argument as to whether the 
prohibition of torture under international law represents an effective mechanism 
for preventing, or at least limiting its use.  
The Current Legal Prohibition of Torture: Internationally and Domestically 
Prevention of torture requires an effective national legal framework that 
incorporates international human rights standards and includes specific 
provisions to prohibit and prevent torture.43  
                                            
Torture is currently outlawed at several levels, in both international law and at a 
regional level in the national legal systems of many different states. This could 
be regarded as significant, as it raises the point as to why two levels of legal 
proscription are considered necessary. Converting international law and 
convention provisions into national laws and measures is nothing revolutionary, 
                                                          
42
 Euƌope Neǁs, ͚Caiƌo DeĐlaƌatioŶ oŶ HuŵaŶ ‘ights iŶ Islaŵ – Diverges from the Universal Declaration 
of HuŵaŶ ‘ights iŶ keǇ aspeĐts͛ <https://en.europenews.dk/Cairo-Declaration-on-Human-Rights-in-
Islam-Diverges-from-the-Universal-Declaration-of-Human-Rights-in-key-respects-78272.html> accessed 
26
th
 October 2017. 
43
Association for the Prevention of Torture < http://www.apt.ch/en/national-level/> (italicised for 
emphasis). 
25 
 
but there is strong evidence on both sides of the argument as to whether it is 
necessary. 
Halliday and Schmidt44 express that nationalised human rights systems are 
perhaps overestimated in their effectiveness, and that more often than not, they 
simply regurgitate the same measures which are set out in European and 
international charters for individual rights and freedoms protection, adding little 
in the form of specialisation or unique customisation of the law for the state 
concerned. This complies with the broad understanding that rights, specifically 
human rights, belong to everyone, no matter what creed, colour, gender or 
culture they identify with, and that they should not be tailored to certain 
countries and adopted in a way which is different to any other, given that in 
essence, human beings are all alike and should all be guaranteed the same 
freedoms and privileges wherever they are in the world. This is in contrast with 
Basoglu’s ‘cultural differences’ view as mentioned earlier. 
Halliday and Schmidt’s notion is exemplified by Donnelly, firstly in his definition 
of the term human rights; ‘Human rights - droits de l’homme, derechos 
humanos, Menschenrechte, “the rights of man” – are literally the rights that one 
has because one is human.45 This is a simple yet profound statement. We are 
all entitled to the same human rights, because we are all human. Further 
categorisations come after this (gender, race, and age for example) but humans 
are all alike at the first instance.   
He follows up this statement by emphasising how human rights can never be 
stripped from an individual: 
Human rights are equal rights: one either is or is not a human being, and 
therefore has the same human rights as everyone else (or none at all).  
Human rights also are inalienable rights: one cannot stop being human, 
no matter how badly one behaves or how barbarously one is treated.  
And they are universal rights, in the sense that today we consider all 
members of the species Home sapiens “human beings” and thus holders 
of human rights.46 
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Donnelly captures the bare essentials of what human rights truly mean in just 
these few sentences. In this vein, it is easy to understand why there is such 
confusion over human rights being both domestically and internationally 
enforceable and asks the question as to why there is need for two similar 
formats. Torture, like most human rights areas, is presented in both of these 
formats. 
Gibney and Skogly give insight into how the reach of international human rights 
is spreading; 
International law, which traditionally has regulated the conduct between 
and among countries, has had at its core the respect for state 
sovereignty.  However, the latter part of the twentieth century witnessed 
fundamental changes to the way in which the international community 
operates that are based upon a deep interdependence among states and 
on the way in which international law regulates the interaction among 
states. This is often labelled the process of globalization.47   
There is also the argument that international law now gives rights to individuals 
and not just nation states, backed up with efficient enforcement measures such 
as the rights of individual petition before international courts. Rights are now 
given by states to their own nationals, not just to foreigners.  
After setting the scene on how the landscape for legal rights is shifting, both 
writers go on to suggest that human rights are distinct in that they are overly-
domesticised. They write: 
The reason why international human rights is so ‘revolutionary’ is that is 
focuses almost exclusively on the ‘vertical’ relationship between the state 
and the subjects of that state, rather than the ‘horizontal’ relationship 
between and among nation-states. However, what human rights has 
almost totally ignored is that in an increasingly interdependent world… it 
is not simply sufficient to assess what domestic governments are doing in 
terms of human rights; it is equally important to assess the effect of other 
actors; intergovernmental organisations, international private entities, and 
foreign states as well.48 
The view of these authors appears to be that a balance of national and 
international regulation of human rights is the best solution. Halliday and 
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Schmidt echo this belief, as they explain why domestic rights are emphasised 
too often;  
There is another sense in which human rights may have been 
‘domesticated’ by being received into national law… the impact of 
bringing rights home has been more like a certain aspect of human rights 
has been more like a ‘damp squib’ than the fireworks anticipated. Human 
rights… have been ‘domesticated’ in the sense of being tamed – by its 
entry into national legal systems.   
By becoming ‘merely law’ human rights becomes subject to the same 
limitations, qualifications, mundanities, and technical operations as other 
aspects of domestic law.49 
These are all valid points. If torture is to be taken seriously as an illegal act by 
all nations, does it lose its impetus and become diluted when channelled into 
the legal systems of individual state charters and constitutions? Or, on the 
contrary, does it become more directly embedded into the legal system of the 
individual state? 
One such opposing view is illustrated by Reif in reviewing a publication by 
Cardenas, who explains that ‘Cardenas takes the position that an NHRI50 can 
enhance accountability in a state through its efforts to make human rights part 
of the public space and dialogue.’51 This is also a key issue – if a human rights 
regime, or more specifically, a statute on the prohibition on torture, were 
incorporated into the criminal code of a state with notorious torture history, such 
as Uzbekistan or North Korea, it would arguably be more apparent to people if 
and when that statute was broken by the authorities. Breach of its provisions 
would be far more obvious because it would be a national statute woven into 
the country’s own legal system. If a state breaches an international convention, 
the inhabitants of that state may not be aware of this because they may not 
have any knowledge of the rules of international law, but breaching a law closer 
to home could have more immediate implications and so it may be more likely 
to provoke a response from, and outrage amongst, the citizens of the state.  
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Uzbekistan is strictly speaking a monist state, so international treaties which it 
has signed and ratified do not usually require any special treatment before 
incorporated into Uzbek law.52 However, as is already the case with regard to 
enforceability and compliance with international treaties, the Uzbek approach to 
its supposed monism is generally symbolic and there is no genuine adoption. 
The OHCHR53 provides insight on this: 
The Preamble of the Uzbek Constitution suggests that the 
Uzbek law gives precedence to international law over national 
law by stating that:  
The people of Uzbekistan ...recognizing the priority of generally 
recognized norms of international law ...adopt ...the present 
Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan...”  
The Criminal Code and CPC also contain provisions which 
suggest that international standards override national ones. 
However, in practice these provisions appear to have little or no 
effect: they are seen as mainly of an inspirational nature, as an 
expression of a desire on the part of the legislator to conform to 
international standards.54 
This provides another stumbling block in terms of the incorporation of 
international anti-torture laws into Uzbekistan, and acts as evidence that the 
Uzbek government has no interest in enforcing such laws domestically. 
The International Stance on Torture: A Brief History 
Torture was only recognised as a global crime relatively recently. Substantial 
legal weight given to historically significant legal charters, such as Magna Carta, 
is seen by some academics as exaggerated, which could be justified in one 
sense given that the charter itself was repealed just a few months after its 
enactment, and that; ‘for some, Magna Carta today represents no more than a 
distant constitutional echo’.55 
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Indeed, for all the rights laid out by Magna Carta, it makes no such reference to 
torture. It wasn’t until 1769 that William Blackstone, an English jurist of the 
eighteenth century, mentioned it in his writings. As Peters explains: 
When William Blackstone briefly considered torture in his ‘Commentaries 
on the Laws of England’ around 1769, he dismissed the subject as not 
being part of the province of English law; the rack was, said Blackstone, 
‘an engine of the state, not of law’. What Blackstone meant – and here he 
echoed legal literature if not actual practice in England from Fortescue on 
– was that torture had no place in Common Law, and its few and 
scattered use had been solely by political authorities for political 
purposes.56 
250 years ago, torture was still seen as at least some part of a nation’s identity 
and an ancient but still occasionally worthwhile tool of justice. The questions 
that need answering are when and why was torture condemned, and also 
whether it was used as punishment, as a means of gathering intelligence, or 
both. Before that, however, there needs to be a close inspection of Uzbekistan’s 
laws on torture, and why they are seemingly ineffective in controlling its use. 
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Chapter 3   
 Uzbekistan’s Laws on Torture 
 
Despite some formal steps toward strengthening safeguards against 
torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, 
serious concerns remain about Uzbekistan’s failure to implement existing 
laws and safeguards, to adopt new effective measures toward the 
prevention of torture, and to hold accountable those responsible for 
torture. 
Egamberdiyev v Russia (2014) 57 
Following on from the discussion of the nature of torture and the legal 
prohibitions on its use in the previous chapter, it is important next to justify why 
the state of Uzbekistan has been chosen as the main focus in this thesis, clearly 
delineate what measures it already has in place to prevent torture, and why, 
and in what ways, they may be regarded as deficient. It needs to be understood 
what exactly makes Uzbekistan stand out, and why its need for radical human 
rights reform and restructuring is arguably greater than that of its neighbours 
such as Afghanistan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. 
Geographically speaking, and in the context of both international and domestic 
legal systems, Uzbekistan is located within a metaphorical no-man’s land; a 
little too eastern to feel the inclusive effects of the pack-leading European 
human rights control mechanisms, for example the ECHR and the strict pre-
requisites to joining the EU. It is, however, a signatory to the Cairo Declaration 
on Human Rights in Islam as of 1990, a charter it automatically became tied to 
due to its membership of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference. However, 
this membership is merely symbolic, as it has had no meaningful impact in 
helping to improve Uzbekistan’s appalling record of human rights abuses. The 
Cairo Declaration has been said to conflict with other international human rights, 
partly, as Kayaoglu explains,58 because of its heavy influence by Shari’ah law 
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which contradicts certain areas of other human rights declarations based on 
secular grounds.59 
Uzbekistan has been blacklisted by human rights bodies for many years,60 (the 
disengagement factor of which could be a crucial reason why Uzbekistan is 
drifting ever further away from international norms) but in order to fully 
understand why torture is such a problem in the country, it is necessary to 
identify what relevant domestic legislation is currently in place, and then analyse 
its efficacy. Whether Uzbekistan is more influenced by international or national 
laws which prohibit torture, in practice these laws are lacking in terms of their 
effectiveness in preventing torture. As a starting point, critical focus must be 
placed on Uzbekistan’s own Criminal Code to determine whether certain 
aspects need particular attention when comparing its provisions with 
corresponding anti-torture charters and legislation in other states, especially 
those which appear to have a relatively clean record concerning the use of 
torture or coercive interrogation amounting to inhuman and degrading 
treatment. A variety of questions also need to be asked; is torture explicitly 
outlawed? Is torture mentioned in the Uzbek Constitution? It must be 
established whether the Uzbek Criminal Code mirrors other human rights codes 
in other countries, and whether it resembles how established international 
conventions deal with the issue of torture, such as the UNCAT or ECHR. 
The Constitution of Uzbekistan 
The most logical starting point for this discussion is to identify whether 
Uzbekistan’s own Constitution outlaws torture. A legal constitution is a set of 
written rules for a state61 and can be analogised as a contract between a 
government and its citizens. The constitution outlines rules and responsibilities 
which both the government and the citizens must obey. Some constitutions 
merely outline the limited powers of a state, such as the US Constitution, and 
have a separate charter concerning the rights of the citizens (or in the case of 
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the US, the Bill of Rights which is part of and an amendment to the original 
drafting of the US Constitution).62 Other states, Uzbekistan included, have 
citizens’ rights embedded in the constitution itself.   
Uzbekistan’s current Constitution was enacted in 1992, replacing the now 
repealed Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan 1978. It has seven 
chapters; State Sovereignty, Democracy, Supremacy of the Constitution and 
the Law, Foreign Policy, General Provisions, Citizenship and Personal Rights 
and Freedoms.   
Under chapter 7, Personal Rights and Freedoms, Article 26 states; 
Everyone, accused of committing a crime, shall be considered not guilty, 
so long as his guilt is not established by legal order, public legal 
proceeding when all possibilities, to protect him, are secured. 
No one may be subject to torture, violence, other cruel or humiliating 
human dignity treatment. 
No one may be subject to medical or scientific experiments without his 
consent.63 
The wording of the prohibition of torture is almost identical to Article 3 of the 
ECHR, which provides that: ‘No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman 
or degrading treatment or punishment’.64 Similarly, Article 5 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights65 states: ‘No one shall be subjected to torture or to 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’. 
The corresponding articles of the ECHR and UDHR are more similar to each 
other than the COU (the ECHR merely has the additional word ‘cruel’), but the 
Uzbekistan version is not much different, and could even be perceived to 
actually have more scope for the protection of torture victims, as it includes the 
words ‘violence’ and ‘dignity’, which are entirely absent from the former. 
Logically, and chronologically, this makes sense. The UDHR was the first fully 
international attempt at criminalising torture, but it could also be seen as an 
imperfect first draft, given that it was passed 69 years ago. The ECHR 
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equivalent is 67 years old and barely differs from the UDHR, yet advances in 
the perception of what constitutes torture over many decades may have evolved 
enough to warrant the COU’s interpretation to be noteworthy in its slight 
alteration; at just 24 years old, the COU is modern by comparison.   
Yet, despite the clarity of Uzbekistan’s constitutional prohibition of torture, the 
continuing condemnation by western states and human rights organisations of 
the endemic torture being committed inside its borders gives an indication that 
no law, neither national nor international, is having meaningful impact. Rather 
than the wording of the law being the concern, it appears that its enforcement is 
the problem. As an illustrative example, terror suspects held by Uzbek 
authorities are reportedly subjected to torture. As reported in the European 
Human Rights Law Review: 
On July 20, the UN Human Rights Committee66 issued its concluding 
observations on the compliance by Uzbekistan with its obligations under 
the ICCPR. The Committee expressed concern at the…“legal safeguards 
for persons suspected of, or charged with, a terrorist or related crime and 
allegations of incommunicado detention, torture and long prison 
sentences in inhuman and degrading conditions”.67 
Furthermore, in the report itself, the UNHRC commented on the definition of 
torture utilised by Uzbekistan, and the ongoing prevalence of unlawful 
treatment, in the following terms: 
The Committee remains concerned that the definition of torture contained 
in the criminal legislation, including article 235 of the Criminal Code, does 
not meet the requirements of article 7 of the Covenant… 
The Committee reiterates its previous recommendation and urges the 
State party, as a matter of urgency, to amend its criminal legislation, 
including article 235 of its Criminal Code, with a view to ensuring that the 
definition of torture is in full compliance with article 1 of the Convention 
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, and with article 7 of the Covenant… 
The Committee remains concerned about reports that torture continues to 
be routinely used throughout the criminal justice system; that, despite the 
existing legal prohibition, forced confessions are in practice used as 
evidence in court… judges fail to order investigations into allegations of 
forced confessions even when signs of torture are visible… persons 
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complaining of torture are subjected to reprisals and family members are 
often intimidated and threatened to ensure that complaints are 
retracted… the rate of prosecution is very low and impunity is prevalent 
(arts. 2, 7 and 14).68 
As revealed by this report, state practice is in contravention of Uzbek 
constitutional law.  
In Ismoilov v Russia, a dispute over the extradition of terror suspects from 
Russia to Uzbekistan to face a national hearing ended with a resounding breach 
of both Articles 5(4) and 6(2) of the ECHR, the right to liberty and the right to a 
fair trial. In May 2005, several armed attackers stormed military barracks in 
Uzbekistan and also broke into a prison, releasing inmates. Hundreds of 
suspects were detained, but the applicants themselves fled to Russia. 
Uzbekistan charged them with terror-related activities and negotiations over the 
suspects’ extradition were exchanged with their Russian counterparts (‘The 
courts held that it was not possible to apply a less restrictive measure and that 
only detention could secure their extradition and “the execution of any sentence 
that might be imposed’69). Russian national courts ordered detention pending 
extradition, and such extradition was allowed in 2006. The applicants claimed a 
breach of Articles 5(4)70 and 6(2)71 of the ECHR. They also claimed under 
Article 4172 in pursuance of just satisfaction.   
It was held by the ECtHR that to identify a breach of the Article 5 right to liberty, 
‘particular regard had to be had to the safeguards provided by the national 
system’.73  Referring to national law, the Court ruled that any deprivation of 
liberty should also be in line with the interpretation of Article 5 of the 
Convention; over-reliance on national law which in anyway detracted or 
                                                          
68
United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Concluding observations on the 
fourth periodic report of Uzbekistan (CCPR/C/SR/.3178 and 3179, 17 August 2015) para 13 – emphasis 
added. 
69
Ismoilov and Others v Russia App no. 2947/06 (ECHR, 24 April 2008) para 35. 
70AƌtiĐle ϱ;ϰͿ ECH‘ pƌoǀides that ͚EǀeƌǇoŶe ǁho is depƌiǀed of his liďeƌtǇ ďǇ aƌƌest oƌ deteŶtioŶ shall ďe 
entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a 
Đouƌt aŶd his ƌelease oƌdeƌed if the deteŶtioŶ is Ŷot laǁful͛. 
71͚EǀeƌǇoŶe Đhaƌged ǁith a ĐƌiŵiŶal offeŶĐe shall ďe pƌesuŵed iŶŶoĐeŶt uŶtil pƌoǀed guiltǇ aĐĐoƌdiŶg to 
laǁ͛. 
72͚If the Couƌt fiŶds that theƌe has ďeeŶ a ǀiolatioŶ of the CoŶǀeŶtioŶ oƌ the PƌotoĐols theƌeto, aŶd if the 
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the 
Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaĐtioŶ to the iŶjuƌed paƌtǇ͛. 
73
Ismoilov v Russia (2008) (Application No 2947/06) (2008) 49 EHRR 1128, (2008) ECHR 2947/06. 
35 
 
deviated from the standards embodied in the Convention would be inadequate. 
It was ultimately determined that ‘The national system failed to protect the 
applicants from arbitrary detention and their detention could not be considered 
'lawful' for the purposes of the detention.’74 There had, therefore been a 
violation of Art 5(1).75 
This case highlighted the shortcomings of national human rights laws in both 
Uzbekistan and Russia, the former’s lack of compliance with the standards 
prescribed by the higher law of the ECHR consequently being responsible for 
the negative ruling. It also shows how the domestic laws on torture are not the 
only failings of the Uzbek criminal justice system, as human rights breaches in a 
range of areas have been well documented.  
However, for Uzbekistan, the ideal solution may be a compromise. A separate, 
codified and entrenched torture statute, which could be adopted as an 
additional protocol to either the COU or Uzbekistan Criminal Code, which 
mirrors many of the key aspects of the ECHR and UDHR, but with slight tweaks 
to some of the wording in order to give it more of a distinctive Uzbek flavour, 
and to give it a cultural sense of national identity and uniqueness. It must be 
stressed that Uzbekistan should feel like such a statute is its own, even if it 
does reiterate most of what other international conventions state. This could 
assist greatly in terms of its enforceability, as being made to follow international 
law could be seen as too distant and invasive of an individual sovereign state’s 
own interpretation of the law. Conversely, as domestic provisions have been 
demonstrated as insufficient in Ismoilov, there would need to be a higher 
standard of enforceability than of current. Additionally, the argument that 
international legal prohibitions are fundamental to all and negate the effects of 
individual state differences and non-compliance also detracts from this 
suggestion.  
However, more evidence to support it comes from Halliday and Schmidt, who, 
in discussing NHRIs, state that:  
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Such institutions mark a recognition that the growing range of 
international human rights standards are not self-executing and that if 
rights are to become a reality for many people then there must be a 
public institution whose task it is to promote and protect them, especially 
where government courts and the media are unwilling or unable to do so.  
In many parts of the world, NHRIs are promoted in a way of making rights 
accessible, especially to poor and marginalised people who may lack the 
resources or knowledge to access lawyers and the courts.76 
 
Chart 3.1: Bar charts comparing the levels of poverty, nutrition, adult literacy 
and clean water in Middle-Eastern, Eastern European, Central Asian and Sub-
Saharan African states. 
It is acceptable to 
suggest that the citizens 
of Uzbekistan fall under 
the catchment of ‘poor 
and marginalised 
people,’77 and that a 
carefully phrased NHRI in 
the form of a torture 
charter/statute could be 
successfully implemented 
and stand a chance of successfully fulfilling its function. The four bar charts 
illustrated in figure 3.1 demonstrate the relative hardships that Uzbek people 
endure, at least in terms of poverty and nutrition. This notion is speculative, and 
so it cannot currently be determined what the true effects of an NHRI based on 
torture could actually have. It may, however, be worth a try at least.  
It is clear that the COU provides a perfectly suitable provision on the prohibition 
on torture, one which would easily be incorporated into any legal system in the 
world, as it meets the standards of many well-respected human rights bodies 
and conventions. However, a severe lack of enforcement of the current law 
makes its very existence almost meaningless.   
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The following pattern is thus discernible: Uzbekistan appears to have the 
necessary constitutional prohibition of torture, but this is frequently ignored in 
practice.  Nevertheless, it is still necessary to consider what other avenues 
Uzbekistan has to protect its citizens from such treatment.  As well as being 
enshrined in the constitution, Uzbekistan also refers to torture in its own criminal 
code. 
The Criminal Code of the Republic of Uzbekistan 199478 
The Criminal Code of the Republic of Uzbekistan was enacted on the 22nd 
September 1994.  It encompasses 586 articles covering a variety of areas, 
including the powers of a court and judges,79 rights and obligations of suspects, 
the types of evidence and proof, laws concerning police questioning and 
detention of suspects, laws on phone-tapping (similar to the UK’s IPA 201680), 
detention facilities and the rights and obligations of detained persons, just to 
name a number of key examples.   
The most relevant areas in relation to torture are located in Article 17, entitled 
‘Respect for Honour and Dignity of Individual’: 
A judge, prosecutor, investigator, and inquiry officer shall respect the 
honour and dignity of individuals participating in case. 
Nobody may be subject to violence, torture, or other cruel or degrading 
treatment. 
Acts or decisions, which degrade dignity, violate privacy, endanger 
health, and cause unjustified physical or moral suffering, shall be strictly 
prohibited.81 
Again, like in the COU, several typical words and phrases are repeated, such as 
‘honour’, ‘dignity’, and ‘degrading’. Also in similar fashion to the COU, the 
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CCRU goes into a lot more detail than in the prohibitions laid out the ECHR and 
UDHR, suggesting a greater degree of stringency.  
A pattern is emerging which appears to suggest that, contrary to what one 
would expect, the more detailed an explanation of how torture is prohibited is 
displayed in a charter or statute of a given state, the less likely it is to follow 
such law, at least in terms of Uzbekistan.  
Additionally, the legal systems of western nations have much less disparity 
between the prohibitions contained in their own statutes and those found in law. 
Rather, they are much more interconnected in terms of legislation. In the UK, 
section 2 of the HRA 1998, entitled ‘interpretation of Convention Rights’, 
ensures all domestic cases concerning rights enshrined in the ECHR must take 
relevant ECtHR82 judgments and Commission decisions into account. They are 
therefore obliged to take into account such judgments and decisions. 
In Germany, this approach is very similar; as explained by Oltermann: 
The federal constitutional court in Germany has effectively given 
constitutional status to the judicial duty to take into account the European 
convention on human rights and the decisions of the Strasbourg court.  In 
the UK this duty is enshrined in section 2 of the Human Rights Act 
1998.83 
Successful domestic human rights law often tends to reproduce much of what is 
mentioned in higher law, whilst also embodying some distinctions relevant to 
the specific national context. For example, the ECtHR is beneficial for 
processing appeals by nationals who reject the ruling of their domestic courts. It 
indirectly enforces the laws of the ECHR where necessary, which as 
established by Mottershaw and Murray, is not a like for like replacement for 
domestic law:  
The ECHR, though an international treaty, is one that "creates not only 
obligations for member states but also rights which are enforceable by 
individuals".  The Court… operates to ensure States Parties observe their 
commitments under the Convention and to ensure that individuals can… 
access this international judicial means of securing their rights. 
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The Court, however… has no powers of its own to implement measures 
in response to findings of violations of Convention rights.  The role of the 
Court is not as a substitute for national mechanisms… domestic 
mechanisms are of fundamental importance for implementation.84 
 
These explanations emphasise the importance of national law, when properly 
applied. Uzbekistan’s failing is its complete disregard of its own constitutional 
and criminal laws, most crucially on torture. In order to determine how reversible 
its situation is, it is instructive to make a comparison between Uzbekistan and 
other states which have either used torture in the past and managed to reduce 
or eradicate such actions through the combination of international pressure and 
the enactment of new statutory instruments, such as that of Jordan, or states 
which still employ torture regularly and what plans are being put into place to 
stop it, one of which is Israel.   
Case Study I: Israel 
The way the Israeli government has chosen to deal with non-violent 
protest against its own anti-democratic practice of administrative 
detention is by instituting yet another serious violation of international law: 
torture - one of the most severe forms of dehumanisation.85 
Israel has as much a dark history of torture usage as Uzbekistan, arguably 
more so as of 2015, when a new national bill was passed which legalised the 
use of force-feeding on hunger-striking suspects.86 This technique is currently 
being used on over 5000 Palestinian political prisoners, some of which have 
been held in indefinite detention for many years and not yet had a proper trial.87   
17 years ago, Public Committee Against Torture v Israel88 considered the extent 
to which physical interrogation practices were deemed lawful when the defence 
of necessity was invoked. The applicants were a combination of human rights 
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organisations and also individuals who had experienced the interrogation 
techniques employed by the Israeli authorities first-hand. These individuals had 
been interrogated for suspicion of committing crimes against Israeli security. 
The Court heard that these extensive interrogation practices included:  
forceful shaking; use of the 'Shabach' position whereby the suspect was 
seated on a low chair tilting forward with his hands tied behind his back 
and his head covered by an opaque sack and subjected to powerfully 
loud music; use of the 'frog crouch' position whereby the suspect was 
compelled to crouch on the tips of his toes for repeated intervals; 
excessive tightening of hand or leg cuffs, and; excessive sleep 
deprivation.89 
The justification for the methods was that they were ‘immediately necessary for 
saving human lives’.90 Applying to the Supreme Court of Israel, the applicants 
argued that the defence of necessity was invalid and that the GSS (General 
Security Service, which carried out the interrogations) did not have the power to 
use psychological and physiological techniques during their questioning 
periods.   
It was held that such interrogations could only be considered lawful when there 
was explicit statutory authorisation. It was ruled that the techniques used in this 
case were not enshrined by statute, but by referring to art 2(1) of the Israeli 
Criminal Procedure Statute, ‘which conferred a general power of interrogation 
on the police, the Minister of Justice particularly authorised the GSS to 
interrogate terrorist suspects’.91 The methods used by the GSS were 
considered unreasonable and unfair and were not an integral part of the 
interrogation process.  
Accordingly, necessity was not an adequate defence in this instance, since it 
did not empower the GSS authority to establish directives concerning the use of 
physically coercive techniques. 
This case provides insightful evidence to support both sides of the claim that the 
domestic law either negates, or fails to prevent, the use of torture. On the one 
hand, the Israeli domestic criminal procedure statute authorised the conducting 
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of interrogation of suspects, yet it also did not permit the argument for necessity 
as justification for the level of force used. On this basis, Israeli national law 
protected the rights of the victims concerned by recognising a breach of its own 
laws on interrogation. This can be used to argue that domestic laws on torture 
can work even in states with a poor recent history of torture, giving some hope 
for Uzbekistan. 
Case Study II: North Korea 
In recent times, North Korea has attracted much negativity with regards to its 
treatment of citizens. Human Rights Watch has been especially critical, 
describing the secretive state as ‘among the world’s most repressive countries’, 
and a 2014 UN Commission of Inquiry revealed that ‘abuses in North Korea 
were without parallel in the contemporary world’.92   
If one was to imagine a theoretical hierarchy of states with notoriety for the use 
of torture and human rights abuses, North Korea would almost certainly be at 
the very top of such a hierarchy, even beyond that of Uzbekistan. If a possible 
solution to Uzbekistan’s actions lies within the implementation of a new torture 
statute, Rumney hypothesises on the practicalities of such a resolution using 
North Korea as an example.   
Would the introduction of a torture statute in North Korea have 
the same societal impact as the same statute introduced in the 
United Kingdom? North Korea, is a country with a record of 
‘widespread and systematic human rights violations’. The state 
has no respect for fundamental human rights. It conducts extra-
judicial killing, torture and has no organised political opposition 
and elections… It is simply inconceivable that a torture law 
would be implemented and interpreted similarly in these two 
nations.93 
Rumney’s incisive comments here indicate that the implementation of a 
domestic torture statute in Uzbekistan could be similarly problematic. However, 
Uzbekistan is not as autocratic as North Korea. It does have elections, albeit 
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infrequently, and they are usually fixed,94 but the situation does appear 
somewhat recoverable, at least compared to North Korea. The possibilities of 
such a torture statute being successfully implemented in Uzbekistan will be 
discussed in further detail in Chapters 6 and 7. 
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Chapter 4 
The Use of Torture in Europe  
Part I 
The various legal prohibitions for the use of torture in Uzbekistan have now 
been clarified. It is now important to take a step back from purely Uzbekistani 
law in order to compare its actions with those of its neighbouring states, and 
also countries which, at first glance, would appear to be places where it would 
not be expected that torture would be in frequent use. These especially include 
fully Westernised European nations, most notably Germany and the UK in Part 
I, as well as Turkey, a state with a more complex history of torture. Additionally, 
a discussion of relevant ECtHR jurisprudence95 is examined, and the diplomatic 
relations between the UK and Jordan are investigated, with torture being the 
focus of what transpired. Part II focuses more on French ECtHR case law, as 
well as an in-depth investigation of the then different laws (to the UK and most 
of Europe) on inhumane punishment in the Isle of Man which came to light in 
Tyrer v UK96 in the 1970s.  
Whilst reviewing the various examples and case law from these jurisdictions, it 
is also worthwhile to judge the severity of each nation’s breach of the laws 
regarding torture.  There are various components to identify and comment on, 
such as whether the crime committed was described as ‘torture’ in the 
jurisprudence, or whether particular cases instead were deemed to involve 
inhuman or degrading treatment.  This is addressed by Grans who explains: 
Not only is the definition of torture a complex issue, the definitional 
threshold between torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment is not clear. This potentially poses a problem in relation to 
those State obligations which apply only to torture and not to other forms 
of ill-treatment.97 
In certain cases, were national statutes breached, but not relevant provisions of 
international charters and conventions, or vice-versa? Another area to 
investigate is whether, geographically speaking, the nature of torture changes 
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culturally, and whether the response and sentencing of breaches of relevant 
legal prohibitions fluctuates according to individual national values. As an 
example, a country with an Islamic heritage like Turkey98 could have different 
parameters and different considerations may be at play when determining 
whether a certain act is classified as torture compared to Italy for example, 
which has a Catholic history; cultural differences may tip the balance in respect 
of particular rulings, whereby treatment which could be perceived as 
constituting either the extreme end of inhuman treatment in one state and the 
least severe end of torture in another.   
It will also be discovered that the mere threat of torture may amount to a breach 
of the law and result in a conviction in certain instances. The act of physically 
carrying out such treatment is not always needed to constitute a breach of 
national and/or international law. Indeed, it may appear that there is therefore a 
sliding scale of torture, whereby threatening or committing the exact same crime 
in different countries may result in differing legal verdicts and consequences. 
The Strasbourg Cases 
As a starting point, it appears appropriate to begin by reviewing the key cases 
to come out of Europe, in particular, cases which have been used as key 
precedents which exert a strong influence upon later rulings. 
Chronologically, and since the ECHR was enacted in 1950, Ireland v UK99 
represents one of the first European cases to involve a legal challenge relating 
to allegations of torture.100 Whilst the treatment involved was held not to amount 
to torture, it was, however, deemed severe enough to count as deliberate 
inhuman and degrading treatment101 and therefore a breach of Article 3. 
Importantly, this case emphasised the distinction between torture and degrading 
treatment, the ECtHR explaining that: 
…ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within 
the scope of Article 3. The assessment of this minimum is, in the nature 
                                                          
98
Turkey has been officially classified as a secular state siŶĐe ϭϵϮϴ thƌough PƌesideŶt Atatuƌk͛s ƌefoƌŵs 
and an amendment to the 1924 Turkish Constitution. 
99
Ireland v United Kingdom ECHR (1978) App no. 5310/71. 
100
For discussion of the details of the case, see chapter one on this thesis. 
101
ibid paras 246, 4. 
45 
 
of things, relative; it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such 
as the duration of the treatment, its physical or mental effects and, in 
some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the victim, etc.102 
It is thus clear that defining torture is not an exact science.  Because Article 3 
ECHR is so brief, its scope has come to be considered debatable, and cases 
are therefore necessarily assessed individually in great detail in order to 
determine whether a breach has been committed. Indeed, the very nature of 
torture, for legal purposes at least, is changeable depending on its context, a 
view which is again supported by Grans, who states: 
The fact that torture is a concept applied not only in human rights law but 
also in international humanitarian law and international criminal law 
makes the situation even more complex. Gaeta has termed the legal 
definition of torture a chameleon, as its elements change depending on 
the particular normative framework.103 
However, the first finding of actual torture came in Aksoy v Turkey104 in the mid-
nineties. In this case, the applicant (A) was arrested and detained by the 
Turkish authorities for fourteen days after being accused of being a member of 
the PKK (Kurdish Workers’ Party), which is still considered a terrorist 
organisation in Turkey. During his detention, A was placed in a small cell of 4.5 
metres with two other prisoners. A was then subjected to brutal torture methods, 
including a technique called ‘Palestinian hanging’. Even prior to the 
commencement of the physical torture, A was threatened with torture when 
questioned about whether he knew the identity of the man who tipped off the 
police as to his whereabouts and which led to his arrest, as revealed by this 
extract form the case facts: 
He was interrogated about whether he knew Metin (the man who had 
identified him). He claimed to have been told: "If you don’t know him now, 
you will know him under torture." 
 
According to the applicant, on the second day of his detention he was 
stripped naked, his hands were tied behind his back and he was strung 
up by his arms in the form of torture known as "Palestinian hanging". 
While he was hanging, the police connected electrodes to his genitals 
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and threw water over him while they electrocuted him. He was kept 
blindfolded during this torture, which continued for approximately thirty-
five minutes. 
 
During the next two days, he was allegedly beaten repeatedly at intervals 
of two hours or half an hour, without being suspended. The torture 
continued for four days, the first two being very intensive. 
 
He claimed that, as a result of the torture, he lost the movement of his 
arms and hands. His interrogators ordered him to make movements to 
restore the control of his hands. He asked to see a doctor, but was 
refused permission.105 
 
Similar to Uzbekistan, both the Turkish Criminal Code106 and the Turkish 
Constitution prohibit a governmental official from carrying out acts of torture or 
ill-treatment against a citizen.  The most recent version of the TCC, which was 
passed in October 2004, classifies torture as an international offence against 
humanity: 
(1) Execution of any one of the following acts systematically under a plan 
against a sector of a community for political, philosophical, racial or 
religious reasons, creates the legal consequence of an offenses against 
humanity. 
a) Voluntary manslaughter, 
b) To act with the intension of giving injury to another person, 
c) Torturing, infliction of severe suffering, or forcing a person to live as a 
slave, 
d) To restrict freedom, 
e) To make a person to be subject to scientific researches/tests 
f) Sexual harassment, child molestation, 
g) Forced pregnancy 
h) Forced prostitution107 
Similarly, the Turkish Constitution has a comparable clause, one which is very 
much like the ECHR’s Article 3, in the form of Article 17(3), which states: ‘No-
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one shall be subjected to torture or ill-treatment; no-one shall be subjected to 
penalties or treatment incompatible with human dignity’.108 
Ultimately, in Aksoy v Turkey the ECtHR, by a majority of eight to one it was 
held that there had been a violation of Article 3.109 It was explained that the 
treatment inflicted by the Turkish authorities was deemed so severe and cruel 
that it constituted torture, and that the State in question was obliged to explain 
why A had injuries after his detention when no such injuries were present before 
being taken into custody.110 No violation of Article 5111 was found.112 
From this case, it is clear that Turkish laws on torture are very similar to those of 
Uzbekistan. Turkey has the added protection of the ECHR since it has been a 
signatory since 1950 and ratified the Convention in 1954.113 It therefore raises 
the question, has the ECHR’s prohibition of torture made any practical 
difference in Turkey, and if Uzbekistan had been allowed to sign the Convention 
in 1950 or subsequently to join the existing 47 state signatories, would this have 
prevented its history of violence? 
Until recently (July 2016) Turkey did not appear to have a major problem with 
torture. However, acting President, Tayyip Erdogan, has been a cause of 
concern amongst human rights organisations and governments in the West for 
his apparent desire to make the modern-day Turkey more Islamic and lessen 
the secular values that have defined Turkey for the past century.114 Even more 
worryingly, the attempted Turkish military coup of 2016 resulted in Erdogan 
expressing a desire to reinstate the death penalty to punish all who took part in 
the rebellion, and unofficial reports state that military rebels were being tortured 
by the Turkish government.115 Inflammatory rhetoric is being used by Erdogan, 
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as he recently vowed to “’clean all state institutions of the virus’ of Fethullah 
Gulen supporters”.116 Yet, whilst it is possible to handpick individual cases, 
there is not, unlike in relation to Uzbekistan, any evidence of a state-sponsored 
regime of torture. However, the direction of Erdogan’s presidency over the next 
few years may be of increasing interest, and Turkey is more of a relatable 
example to Uzbekistan, particularly given the recent moves of President 
Erdogan, and can usefully be applied by analogy to the position of Uzbekistan.  
It is also important to assess whether the ECHR has proven effective in 
preventing the use of torture in nations, and to consider what domestic 
frameworks they have in place as further protection. Gafgen v Germany117 is a 
much more recent example of how the mere threat of torture is enough to 
breach the prohibition contained in Article 3 ECHR.   
In Gafgen, the applicant (A) brought a child to his abode, murdered him, hid the 
body, and demanded a ransom from the child’s parents, who were unaware of 
the murder. After the parents paid the ransom, the German authorities arrested 
A and took him into custody. During A’s interrogation, the police still believed 
the child to be alive and so, acting under this assumption, told A that if he did 
not disclose the child’s location, he would endure considerable suffering.  The 
case report reveals the specifics of this: 
Early in the morning of 1 October 2002, before M. came to work, Mr 
Daschner (“D.”), deputy chief of the Frankfurt police, ordered another 
officer, Mr Ennigkeit (“E.”), to threaten the applicant with considerable 
physical pain, and, if necessary, to subject him to such pain in order to 
make him reveal the boy’s whereabouts.  D.’s subordinate heads of 
department had previously and repeatedly opposed such a measure. 
Detective officer E. thereupon threatened the applicant with subjection to 
considerable pain at the hands of a person specially trained for such 
purposes if he did not disclose the child’s whereabouts.  According to the 
applicant, the officer further threatened to lock him in a cell with two huge 
black men who would sexually abuse him.  The officer also hit him 
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several times on the chest with his hand and shook him so that, on one 
occasion, his head hit the wall.118 
As a result of this threat, A confessed to his crime and disclosed the location of 
the child’s corpse. In the ECtHR, it was held that the threat of torture constituted 
inhuman treatment, but not torture, and that Article 3 had been breached, the 
Court asserting:   
Having regard to the relevant factors for characterising the 
treatment to which the applicant was subjected, the Court is 
satisfied that the real and immediate threats against the 
applicant for the purpose of extracting information from him 
attained the minimum level of severity to bring the impugned 
conduct within the scope of Article 3. 
Contrasting the applicant’s case to those in which torture has 
been found to be established in its case-law, the Court 
considers that the method of interrogation to which he was 
subjected in the circumstances of this case was sufficiently 
serious to amount to inhuman treatment prohibited by Article 3, 
but that it did not reach the level of cruelty required to attain the 
threshold of torture.119 
In the judgment, it was appreciated that the German authorities acted in the 
best interests of the child, and, believing he was alive at the time, were in a 
‘ticking bomb’ scenario where time was critical and the threat of torture could 
and most likely would have prevented a possible catastrophe were the child not 
already dead. Even in such a situation, however, no extenuating circumstances 
may be used as a reasonable defence,120 it being held that:  
Torture, inhuman or degrading treatment cannot be inflicted even in 
circumstances where the life of an individual is at risk.  No derogation is 
allowed even in the event of a public emergency threatening the life of 
the nation.  Article 3, which has been framed in unambiguous terms, 
recognises that every human being has an absolute, inalienable right not 
to be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment under any 
circumstances, even the most difficult…121  
It should especially be noted that the judgment emphasised that Article 3 is 
unambiguous, essentially stating that there was no room for doubt that all forms 
of torture are prohibited, no matter the circumstances. The literal meaning of 
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Article 3 was fully protected in this case.  The ECtHR continued in this vein by 
ruling that: 
The philosophical basis underpinning the absolute nature of the right 
under Article 3 does not allow for any exceptions or justifying factors or 
balancing of interests, irrespective of the conduct of the person 
concerned and the nature of the offence at issue.122 
One of the most concerning aspects of this case is the lengths the police went 
to in order to contravene standard procedure and willingly use torture against A 
despite being aware that this constituted a breach of the law.  Indeed, ‘The 
authorisation was fully documented in the police file, and was taken in defiance 
of explicit orders to the contrary by superiors’.123 This one example is clearly 
insufficiently weighty evidence to suggest that a system of official state-
sponsored torture by the German state exists, but it at least indicates how 
Uzbekistan’s problem with torture is not unique.124 It is expected that a well-
respected country like Germany would fully train their officials to observe 
international law. 
Torture and Inhuman and Degrading Treatment: A Sliding Scale? 
Gafgen has evidenced that state authorised inhuman treatment is a very real 
possibility in Europe. However, if the assessment of legality can be identified as 
being on a sliding scale, several differing levels of severity are observable.  The 
outcome of Aksoy can be related to Uzbekistan much more, mainly because of 
a finding of actual torture rather than inhuman treatment and the brutality of the 
mistreatment; but it is still an isolated case.   
It is arguable that it does not matter whether a ruling finds merely inhuman 
treatment or actual torture, since either is enough to breach Article 3, however 
in realistic terms, severe torture should be recognised as a major matter of 
concern, particularly in light of the manner and volume of which it is being 
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administered in Uzbekistan. It may be submitted that the distinction is 
significant; Janis, Kay and Bradley agree that torture has distinct levels of 
gradation, observing that: 
The nature of torture admits gradation in its intensity, in its severity and in 
the methods adopted. It is, therefore, primarily the duty and responsibility 
of the authority conducting the enquiries from close quarters, after taking 
into account all the surrounding circumstances, evidence and material 
available, to say whether in a particular case inhuman ill-treatment 
reached the degree of torture.125   
Evidence obtained by torture 
One of the major issues with the use of torture in Uzbekistan is that a large 
volume of evidence obtained by Uzbek authorities through the use of torture 
against suspects is accepted as fully binding in the courts.126  
Amnesty International has repeatedly reported on this situation. In their 2015 
Secrets and Lies report, for example, they claim that: 
Torture and ill-treatment continue to be used to extract 
confessions and other incriminating information and to 
intimidate and punish detainees in pre-charge and pre-trial 
detention.  Courts continue to rely heavily on these torture-
tainted “confessions” to convict.  In most – if not all – of the 
cases in this report, judges ignored or dismissed as unfounded 
allegations of torture or other ill-treatment, even when 
presented with credible evidence in court.127   
As Amnesty notes: 
This practice continues despite the Plenum of the Supreme 
Court having issued four directives since 1996 explicitly 
prohibiting the use of torture to extract confessions and the 
admissibility of such tainted confessions in court 
proceedings.128 
Such statements are concerning. This is the clearest evidence yet that the 
problems Uzbekistan faces over its accusations of the use of torture stems from 
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the domestic framework of its judicial system. It appears to be fighting against 
itself, and is confused as to its official line – on the one hand, its highest court 
has tried to address and remedy the situation,129 yet on the other, judges 
appear largely indifferent to allegations that torture has been used when faced 
with such claims in legal challenges.   
The International Partnership for Human Rights130 also reports similar findings 
and echo Amnesty in stating that: 
Four directives by the Plenum of the Supreme Court issued 
since 1996 explicitly prohibiting the use of torture and other ill-
treatment to extract confessions and the admissibility of 
evidence obtained through torture have not been implemented 
in practice.  The provisions in the Supreme Court directives 
have not been incorporated into the Criminal Procedure 
Code.131 
The IPHR then go on to explain that: 
Courts in Uzbekistan continue to rely heavily on ‘confessions’ 
extracted under torture, duress or deception.  Judges ignore or 
dismiss allegations of torture or other ill-treatment, even when 
directly presented with credible evidence in court.  There are 
reports of some cases where false confessions have been 
filmed on camera, and Amnesty International, AHRCA and 
IPHR are aware of at least two recent cases where people 
were tortured to “confess” on camera to charges which they 
later denied in court.132 
Based on these findings, it would be easy to suggest that if Uzbekistan truly 
wished to change its ways, it would have done so by now.  Corruption seems to 
be the main driving force behind the direction in which the judiciary goes; 
‘Formally, the judicial system in Uzbekistan is independent but government 
interference and corruption are common’.133 The attitude of national judges 
appears to be a major stalling point for any genuine progress.   
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In addition, the CCRU is not unalterable as a statute; it is flexible and open to 
amendments and additions. For example, Uzbekistan has already successfully 
amended the CCRU by adding a new section entitled ‘International cooperation 
in criminal matters’, and also a new article on the admissibility of evidence.134  
Therefore implementing a new section on torture would be feasible.   
Evidence obtained by torture has already been determined as not being 
admissible in English law since the judgment of A and others v Secretary of 
State for the Home Department135 in 2005. The facts were that the applicants 
were detained in the UK under the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 
after being issued certificates demonstrating that they were a terror threat. The 
applicants argued that the evidence behind the decision to grant the certificates 
was obtained by torture from foreign powers and should therefore be deemed 
inadmissible. It was held in the House of Lords that evidence obtained by 
torture should not be admitted.  Lord Carswell ruled that the reasoning behind 
the prohibition on accepting evidence obtained by torture was due to 
unreliability of such evidence, and was also based on the ‘morality of giving any 
countenance to the practice’.136 
The ruling in this case shows how the judiciaries of certain states can differ 
greatly. The fact that the UK was in favour of protecting Article 3137 ECHR 
shows how far some states are willing to go to distance themselves from any 
connection to torture, no matter how vague, as it is considered a taboo subject 
by many. Posner and Vermeule debated this notion, stating: 
People often say, in sweeping terms, that torture (and by subsumption 
coercive interrogation) is in some general sense “evil” or “wrong.” People 
want to be well thought of by others, want to be seen to stand on the right 
side of charged moral questions, and tend to follow the moral judgments 
of others if they are themselves unsure what morality requires. Perhaps 
these phenomena are linked.138 
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Can moral guilt be a way of pressurising Uzbekistan into ceasing its current 
stance on torture? Perhaps the media spotlight needs to be shone more 
brightly, in the hope that in turn, greater public awareness can pressure change 
as the volume of international condemnation increases.   
A good model to base this on is that of Jordan. Until 2012, Jordan used torture 
ubiquitously in similar vein to Uzbekistan, the most high profile cases being 
those of suspected Islamists who were alleged of plotting against Jordanian 
national security. As recently as 2008, HRW documented such treatment in a 
random prison visit, identifying: 
credible allegations of ill-treatment, often amounting to torture, 
from 66 out of 110 prisoners interviewed at random in 2007 and 
2008, and in each of the seven of Jordan's 10 prisons visited. 
Human Rights Watch's evidence suggests that five prison 
directors personally participated in torturing detainees.139 
This changed when Abu Qatada Al-Filistini, a radical Jordanian cleric with 
suspected terrorist links, was detained in the UK several times throughout the 
2000s. His extradition to Jordan to face trial in his own national courts was 
blocked on multiple occasions by the ECtHR because of the strong probability 
he would be tortured in his native state, and due to the prospect that evidence 
obtained by torture would be used in his re-trial for terrorism offences in Jordan, 
this would constitute a breach of the UK’s obligations under Article 6 EHCR.140   
Partially due to the pressure from the UK, and to secure the bargain of getting 
Qatada on their own soil to face trial, Jordan agreed to amend their constitution 
and prohibit torture absolutely:   
torture has been illegal in Jordan since 2006, and last year 
(2011) the Jordanian constitution was amended to make it clear 
that not only is torture forbidden, but 
“any statement extracted from a person under duress...or the 
threat thereof shall neither be taken into consideration or relied 
on.” 
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That is a direct quotation from article 8.2 of the Jordanian 
constitution.141 
The UK successfully influenced Jordan’s decision to change its own laws on 
torture in order to fulfil an end result, the successful deportation of Qatada with 
assurances that he would not be subjected to such treatment on foreign territory 
and that torture would not be used in his re-trial.   
Qatada was eventually deported in 2013. The example of Jordan, and the fact 
that it changed its laws partly due to a mutual agreement between itself and the 
UK and international pressure will be discussed in further detail later on, but it is 
worth mentioning now because a similar course of action could shift the 
attitudes of the Uzbek government and pressurise change in a similar way. 
The model of the pressures that the UK applied to Jordan could be used, in 
conjunction with a number of different solutions to slowly reduce the levels of 
torture in Uzbekistan. 
Part II of this chapter will discuss more relevant case law which can be used as 
precedent to argue why what Uzbekistan is doing is wrong, morally, legally, and 
socially. Historical regimes which employed torture will also be looked at in 
detail, and the similarities between such regimes and the Uzbek stance will be 
discussed. In addition, it will also be useful to consider current academic opinion 
on what solutions are currently available to remedy illegal uses of torture. 
Dershowitz believes that torture warrants are realistic ways of controlling its 
use,142 but this idea is criticised by others. Perhaps an amalgamation of several 
different tactics will be the way forward. 
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Part II 
Torture is a staple in tyrannical regimes. Enemies are tortured 
mercilessly for information and then killed. Political opponents 
are tortured to death to send a powerful deterrent message.  
For understandable reasons, torture has become a symbol of 
tyranny.  The fact is that torture has not gone away.143 
 
Now that an understanding of the international scope of the problem of torture 
perpetrated by, or on behalf of, states has been established, it is logical to 
identify further examples of state-controlled mistreatment in order to put 
Uzbekistan’s situation into greater context.  Additionally, more lessons may be 
learned from failed autocratic regimes of the past and such regimes may be 
used as contextual examples. 
It is already evident that examples of actual torture in Europe are not 
commonplace, which makes the task of relating a substantial number of 
European cases to Uzbekistan challenging, but nevertheless there are some 
particularly relevant examples to follow.   
In the UK, one of the few findings of inhuman and degrading treatment came in 
Ireland v UK.144 A similar ruling to Ireland was reached in Tyrer v UK145 the 
same year. Here, a 15 year old child from the Isle of Man had been subjected to 
a physical punishment by a policeman known as ‘birching’. This is an act similar 
to that of caning, whereby the victim is thrashed with the bark and leaves of a 
birch tree bound together to make a firm rod.146   
The child was struck three times across the buttocks in private, and as part of 
the ordeal, was required to take down his trousers and underwear.  The case 
was taken to the ECtHR, where it was held that birching was severe enough to 
constitute inhuman and degrading treatment and therefore breached Article 3 of 
the ECHR, but did not constitute torture, the Court stating: 
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In its report, the Commission expressed the opinion that judicial 
corporal punishment, being degrading, constituted a breach of 
Article 3… and that, consequently, its infliction on the applicant 
was in violation of that provision. 
 
The Court shares the Commission’s view that Mr. Tyrer’s 
punishment did not amount to "torture" within the meaning of 
Article 3… The Court does not consider that the facts of this 
particular case reveal that the applicant underwent suffering of 
the level inherent in this notion as it was interpreted and applied 
by the Court in its judgment of 18 January 1978 (Ireland v. the 
United Kingdom).147 
 
The ECtHR used Ireland as precedent when explaining its judgment in Tyrer, 
and identified a divergence between the two cases with regard to the severity of 
the mistreatment applied.  Neither case resulted in a finding of torture, but a 
sliding scale of inhuman and degrading treatment was still identified: Whilst the 
treatment in Ireland was considered more severe than in Tyrer, both cases still 
involved a breach of Article 3 due to its absolute nature. Upon making a 
distinction between Tyrer and Ireland, as well as justifying its decision to 
indicate that the treatment applied in Tyrer was not considered severe enough 
to be classified as ‘inhuman’, the Court explained that: 
…it remains true that the suffering occasioned must attain a 
particular level before a punishment can be classified as 
“inhuman” within the meaning of Article 3. Here again, the 
Court does not consider on the facts if the case that that level 
was attained and it therefore concurs with the Commission that 
the penalty imposed on Mr. Tyrer was not “inhuman 
punishment” within the meaning of Article 3.148 
The Court also considered several elements of the case in order to come to its 
overall conclusion that Article 3 was breached but inhuman treatment was not 
identified. One of these key elements was the argument, posed by the Attorney-
General for the Isle of Man, that because the punishment administered to the 
child was done in private rather than public view, this nullified the possibility of 
the act being classed as ‘humiliating’.  Humiliation can be considered one of the 
criteria for inhuman treatment, and although the argument of privacy was 
acknowledged, the Court also explained that the lack of public viewing did not 
                                                          
147
ibid (28-29). 
148
Tyrer v United Kingdom ECHR (1978) 2 EHRR 1 para 29. 
58 
 
completely negate the perception of humiliation on behalf of the child, stating 
that the ‘absence of publicity will (not) necessarily prevent a given punishment 
from falling into that category: it may well suffice that the victim is humiliated in 
his own eyes, even if not in the eyes of others’.149 
This particular strand of the case was given extra legal weight when the Court 
summarised its ruling, and its influence was such that a finding of ‘degrading’ 
treatment was ultimately reached.   
Being one of the two criteria explicitly outlined in Article 3, a finding of degrading 
treatment is enough to constitute a breach, yet inhuman treatment was still 
found to be absent. The main reasoning for this was determined by the lack of 
clear evidence of lasting psychological effects that the birching punishment may 
have had on the applicant.  Using this as the test for inhuman treatment in this 
particular case, it was explained that: 
If psychological effects could be established, and if these were 
appreciable and more than merely temporary, there might be a 
case for calling the punishment “inhuman”, but none of this 
would have the slightest bearing on the question of degradation 
or debasement.150 
Since the judgment of Tyrer, as McCrudden explains, it has been used as a 
yardstick in relation to the challenge of several legal rights, including the Article 
6 ECHR right to a fair hearing and Article 3 ECHR right to private life: 
The first reference by the Court (ECtHR) to human dignity was 
in Tyrer v. UK in which corporal punishment, administered as 
part of a judicial sentence, was held to be contrary to Article 3 
on the ground that it was an assault ‘on precisely that which it is 
one of the main purposes of Article 3 to protect, namely a 
person's dignity and physical integrity’. Since then, it has been 
drawn on in the context of the right to a fair hearing, the right 
not to be punished in the absence of a legal prohibition, the 
prohibition of torture, and the right to private life. The Court now 
regards human dignity as underpinning all of the rights 
protected by the Convention.151 
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These two examples signify the complexities when reading between the lines 
on the prohibition of torture. Article 3 of the ECHR is absolute, yet there are still 
degrees of severity in assessing whether the treatment constitutes torture or 
inhuman and degrading treatments which are debated upon by judges in 
individual cases.   
This apparent lack of clarity when classifying whether a certain act is ‘torture’, 
‘inhuman treatment’, or ‘degrading treatment’ is criticised by Greer, who 
expresses his opinion that taking a non-committal stance on a topic of such 
importance is unfeasible: 
…[S]ince absoluteness is not an express, inherent, self-evident, 
or necessary feature of the provisions in question, this status is 
a matter of attribution rather than, as the orthodoxy holds, 
inherent legal necessity. Other non-absolute interpretations are 
not only possible, but expressly underpin similar prohibitions in 
some celebrated national human rights instruments. It does not 
follow either, because the term ‘cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment’ is typically included in the same clauses which 
prohibit torture, that each of these very different types of 
harmful conduct must necessarily share the same status. The 
much-repeated claim that the prohibition is absolute in principle 
but relative in application is also unconvincing.152 
Grans, on the contrary, makes slightly more allowance for the slippery nature of 
the prohibition of torture, explaining that because torture is unique in that its 
reach spreads across several separate branches of law, its complex nature is 
its own downfall in given circumstances.153 Additionally, the ECHR is a living 
instrument, designed to accommodate changes in values, society and 
technology.  
These opinions help paint a picture of how polarising the topic of torture in law 
can be, and the fact that it is difficult to pin down both an accepted definition 
and a laterally agreed mainstream method to interpret the laws concerning 
torture in court make the challenge of tackling Uzbekistan’s use of it even larger 
in scale. 
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Greer also claims that the ‘absolute nature’ of torture is actually an 
interpretation (not black letter law) by judges themselves, and that ‘the term, 
‘formally unqualified rights’,154 is arguably more accurate and begs fewer 
questions’.155 
Nonetheless, the slightly fogged interpretation of these laws by judges has 
remained a relative constant throughout ECtHR case law, and can be 
exemplified further with the next set of cases. 
The French ECtHR cases 
Selmouni v France156 is another example of inhuman and degrading treatment 
as authorised by the state, the judgment in which involved a consideration of 
whether there was a clear, discernible difference between inhuman treatment 
and torture. The applicant, a joint Dutch/Moroccan national, had been arrested 
in France for drug trafficking offences, and was sentenced to 13 years 
imprisonment. During his 3 day custody, the applicant claimed he was 
subjected to several physical punishments.  An extract from his account of the 
mistreatment is as follows: 
After I had been subjected to a body search, during which 
everything in my possession was taken, my interrogation by 
five police officers began. 
One of them, who appeared to be in charge, made me kneel on 
the floor and began pulling my hair while another one hit me in 
the ribs with a stick resembling a baseball bat.157 
The applicant then goes on to describe how he was repeatedly tapped on 
the head with the baseball bat, before being punched, stamped on and 
subjected to further questioning whilst having his hair violently pulled.158 
In the evening of the same day, when there were fewer staff on 
the first floor, I was questioned again by six police officers, who 
were particularly brutal to me. I was punched, and beaten with 
a truncheon and a baseball bat. They all carried on assaulting 
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me until 1 a.m. I think that this session of ill-treatment had 
begun at about 7 p.m.159 
He then documents that the head police officer dragged him down a long 
corridor by the hair and was made to run, whilst the other officers stood either 
side of him tripping him as he went.160 
It was held that there had been a violation of Article 3 ECHR, but the Court also 
described the ECHR as a ‘living instrument’ which is flexible and changes over 
time, as attitudes to the interpretation of the law can alter or adapt to 
contemporary perspectives. As such, it was ruled that although Article 3 had 
been breached, similar cases in the past, including Tyrer v UK,161 showed that 
the treatment involved constituted inhuman and degrading treatment rather than 
torture. Arguably, this should still constitute a violation given the absoluteness of 
Article 3. Nevertheless, it was observed that: 
The Court has previously examined cases in which it concluded 
that there had been treatment which could only be described as 
torture (see the Aksoy judgment … and the Aydın judgment …).  
However, having regard to the fact that the Convention is a 
“living instrument which must be interpreted in the light of 
present-day conditions” (see, among other authorities, the 
following judgments: Tyrer v. the United Kingdom, … Soering 
… and Loizidou v. Turkey, … the Court considers that certain 
acts which were classified in the past as “inhuman and 
degrading treatment” as opposed to “torture” could be classified 
differently in future. 162 
The Court noted that there had been a transition over time in that the threshold 
level for torture has been lowered somewhat when concerning the defence of 
human rights and, in this case, Article 3. The judge stated that: 
It takes the view that the increasingly high standard being 
required in the area of the protection of human rights and 
fundamental liberties correspondingly and inevitably requires 
greater firmness in assessing breaches of the fundamental 
values of democratic societies.163 
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The ruling in Selmouni shows how the laws on torture are never left to 
stagnate. Over time, standards are raised; the incidence of cases resulting in 
convictions of torture rather than degrading and inhuman treatment may not 
be substantially increasing, but it has been made clear that, in general, torture 
thresholds are lowering and ‘society is raising its expectations’ on the topic of 
torture, resulting in higher standards and greater expectations on rulings.164 
Perception of what constitutes torture evolves, rather than stays constant or 
regresses. This can only be a positive, especially when attempting to hold 
Uzbekistan to account for its crimes. Uzbekistan should look to take heed of 
this fact, and realise that it is not too late for it to adapt to the changing nature 
of torture thresholds and change its provisions accordingly, using European 
precedent such as Selmouni.  
Another interesting development in Selmouni was the fact that the distinction 
was made between the state and state actors, in this case the police officers 
acting on behalf of the state and carrying out the mistreatment of the applicant. 
Here, Yeo refers to the judgments in the ECtHR: 
In Selmouni v France, the ECtHR found that the French 
government was liable to the appellant even though disciplinary 
action had been taken against the police officers who had 
allegedly ill-treated him. The case once again concerned the 
question of compensation for past wrongs, but this judgment 
and others clearly indicate that in the case law of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, a state is responsible for the 
actions of its employees.165   
Yeo also explains that both Ireland and Selmouni concerned state officials 
improperly carrying out their duties, and that both cases demonstrate the 
positives and negatives of applying the ‘course of employment’ analysis. 
The law in other jurisdictions might not, however, particularly if 
the employer had prohibited such modes of carrying out duties 
and taken remedial action when alerted to the problem. In 
Ireland v UK, the Court upheld the finding of the Commission, 
which was not disputed by the UK government, that the 
                                                          
164͚EuƌopeaŶ Couƌt of HuŵaŶ ‘ights: “uiĐide iŶ PƌisoŶ: “tate͛s Duties Toǁaƌds MeŶtally Ill Prisoners, 
DisĐipliŶaƌǇ PuŶishŵeŶts as IŶhuŵaŶ PuŶishŵeŶt, aŶd the IŶadeƋuaĐǇ of ‘eŵedies͛ [ϮϬϬϭ] JouƌŶal of 
Criminal Law Vol 65(2), para 11. 
165
 ColiŶ Yeo, ͚AgeŶts of the “tate: WheŶ is aŶ OffiĐial of the “tate aŶ AgeŶt of the “tate?͛ ;ϮϬϬϮͿ 
International Journal of Refugee Law 14 (4): 531. 
63 
 
interrogation techniques involve constituted a ‘practice’. In 
Selmouni v France, the state had only very belatedly taken any 
remedial action.166 
Towards the end of this study, when a more detailed focus on how large a role 
the state of Uzbekistan has to play in its use of torture is given, it will be 
important to report on whether Uzbek officials call upon state actors to carry 
out their work, or whether the blame lies solely at the door of state officials. 
Another French ECtHR case which involved a breach of Article 3 by the state 
came in Tomasi v France.167 A,168 a French national, was a member of a 
Corsican political group called the Corsican National Liberation Group, which 
sought independence from France. In 1982, the group attacked a Foreign 
Legion rest centre, and as a result of which a French soldier was killed. The 
French authorities suspected A of having contributed to the attack, and he was 
arrested. A claimed he had been subjected to various violent assaults during 
his interrogation and incarceration period, and his statement is as follows: 
I was beaten for forty hours non-stop. I didn’t have a moment’s 
rest. I was left without food and drink. 
A police-officer, whom I would be able to recognise, held a 
loaded pistol to my temple and to my mouth, to make me talk. I 
was spat upon in the face several times. I was left undressed 
for a part of the night, in an office, with the doors and windows 
open. It was in March. 
I spent almost all the time in police custody standing, hands 
handcuffed behind the back. They knocked my head against 
the wall, hit me in the stomach using forearm blows and I was 
slapped and kicked continuously. When I fell to the ground I 
was kicked or slapped to make me get up. 
They also threatened to kill me, Superintendent [D.] and officer 
[A.] told me that if I managed to get off they would kill me. They 
also said that they would kill my parents. They said that there 
had been an attack at Lumio where there had been a person 
injured and that the same thing would happen to my parents, 
that they would use explosives to kill them.169 
Both physical and psychological types of torture are mentioned here, the latter 
referring to the threats of execution and the threat of harm to A’s family. Using 
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Ireland v UK as precedent, A argued that the blows he suffered ‘not only 
caused him intense physical and mental suffering; they had also aroused in 
him feelings of fear, anguish and inferiority capable of humiliating him and 
breaking his physical or moral resistance’.170 In their defence, the French 
government argued that the Commission had misunderstood the scope of 
Article 3. It was ultimately held that the severity of the blows applied to A 
reached the threshold of inhuman and degrading treatment, and despite the 
Court conceding that the French state had its hands tied somewhat when 
interrogating potential terror suspects, such a fact cannot be used as an 
excuse to allow the lessening of safeguards in place to protect such suspects 
from physical coercion. The judge stated that:   
The Court… does not consider that it has to examine the 
system of police custody in France and the rules pertaining 
thereto, or, in this case, the length and the timing of the 
applicant’s interrogations. It finds it sufficient to observe that the 
medical certificates and reports, drawn up in total 
independence by medical practitioners, attest to the large 
number of blows inflicted on Mr Tomasi and their intensity; 
these are two elements which are sufficiently serious to render 
such treatment inhuman and degrading. The requirements of 
the investigation and the undeniable difficulties inherent in the 
fight against crime, particularly with regard to terrorism, cannot 
result in limits being placed on the protection to be afforded in 
respect of the physical integrity of individuals.171  
Again, in similar circumstances to Selmouni, the exact burden of guilt placed 
directly on the state was in dispute before the final verdict. The French 
government did not dispute the visible injuries to A, but they argued that the 
level of severity of such injuries was not consistent with the level of force used 
by the police. Smith notes the dismissal of this claim by the ECtHR; 
‘Strasbourg rejected this argument. It held that the applicant's precise and 
detailed description of events, with an absence of evidence or explanation to 
the contrary, made it appropriate to infer that the authorities were responsible 
for an art.3 violation’.172  
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The outcomes of these cases make it appear that Uzbek accountability may 
be easier to prove when looking in depth at cases coming out of Uzbekistan.  
In theory, if the Uzbek government is ever brought to an international court 
such as the ICC173 to face a hearing and it decides to lay the blame on the 
police, it is looking more likely that prosecution of the government itself is 
feasible. Indeed, Uzbekistan already uses a lot of its torture techniques on 
terror suspects, echoing the facts of Tomasi. The extent of which is that it 
often uses an ‘overly-broad definition of terrorism and terrorist activities’ to 
‘charge and prosecute members or suspected members of banned Islamic 
movements’.174 
In relation to Uzbekistan, successful accountability and state liability may be 
sought using the precedent of such European cases, and may negate the 
effect which Uzbekistan has of blaming use of torture on non-state actors. It is 
however acknowledgeable that this would be case dependent.  
One glaring problem with this is that in Uzbekistan’s own criminal code, 
despite outlawing torture, it specifically excludes non-state actors or third 
parties, a point which has been importantly raised by Marchesi: 
Similarly, in another former Soviet Republic, Uzbekistan, Article 
235 of the Criminal Code, which was also amended in 2003 in 
order to include a definition of torture which is largely based on 
Article 1, ‘does not cover acts by “other persons acting in an 
official capacity” including those acts that result from instigation, 
consent or acquiescence of a public official.175 
This means that any domestic legislation will most likely prove ineffective if it 
did not address this issue or amend this provision, and consequently, external 
regulations will be needed. However, this still gives some hope when moving 
forward. Further discussion of this topic will be given in Chapter 6. 
Certainly, in Europe at least, there are multiple examples of legal provisions 
aimed at eliminating torture from a variety of sources. In May 2016, the 
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President of the Parliamentary Assembly for the Council of Europe, Pedro 
Agramunt, stated that he was: 
proud of the role that the Council of Europe has played in 
helping to expose how some European nations colluded in 
torture” and expressed the “sincere hope… that torture will 
never again take place on European soil with the complicity of 
State authorities.176 
A somewhat optimistic, and arguably naïve, aspiration, Agramunt’s statement 
here nevertheless indicates the notion that state-implicit torture, at least in 
Europe, could eventually be eradicated through repeated convictions and the 
systematic upholding of the various relevant statutory safeguards, along with a 
steadily declining threshold and tolerance when ruling on what constitutes 
torture. Additionally, there needs to be an acceptance of the evidence which 
shows that rapport and a build-up of trust between interviewer and interviewee 
is a far more effective tool of intelligence gathering as opposed to torture in 
today’s society.177  
Now that the extent to which the use of torture in Europe has been discussed 
more deeply, it is logical to expand the search for other states which have had 
similar regimes and difficulties in eradicating the use of torture from their own 
internal police systems. Latin America has often been cited when scholars and 
human rights activists alike have been aiming to provide a yardstick by which to 
compare current problem states with past failures with regard to torture. An 
analysis of the region’s historical ties with torture will now help to further clear 
the path towards the ultimate goal of providing sensible solutions towards the 
question of how to stop Uzbekistan from torturing its citizens.   
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Chapter 5 
The Use of Torture in Latin America 
 
In order to put Uzbekistan’s state-controlled torture regime into greater context, 
it is important to identify various relevant past and present examples of torture 
being committed on a similar scale in other countries. Some states have been 
mentioned already, including Israel and Turkey,178 but although such countries 
have committed torture in the past, they are arguably less significant in 
comparison with more infamous examples. 
Since torture has evolved over time, both in terms of the justification for its use 
and the methods of its application, a clear contrast is visible between the use of 
enhanced interrogation techniques in western countries today and less 
developed countries which used torture during the late 20th century.  
Advances in technology have made it easier than ever to conduct tests on 
humans and discover where their main mental weaknesses lie. The use of 
sophisticated equipment, EEGs for example, can monitor victims’ stress levels 
and modify torture techniques accordingly, based on the suspects vital signs.179 
However, it requires more stringent testing and specialised equipment, whereas 
when someone has been severely beaten, it is rather more obvious to the 
naked eye what has happened to them. However, in Latin America during the 
latter half of the 20th century, physical torture was still very much the norm; 
culturally, the different types of torture depend on geographical location, as 
different states use different methods. As Basoglu explains: 
The physical manifestations of torture are as diverse as the 
oppressive societies and types of torture inflicted by them… For 
example, under the Khmer Rouge, Cambodian civilians were 
commonly subjected to starvation, brain washing and hard 
labour. In contrast, Latin American regimes have frequently 
subjected their political prisoners to electric shock… dunking of 
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the head in water which is often fouled by human waste and… 
beatings of the soles of the feet.180 
Identifying this trend provides a useful introduction to the facts on the 
prevalence of torture, and the reasons for its use in Latin America during the 
latter 20th century. Mendez elaborates on this, explaining that:  
In the current democratic era, torture continues to be used, 
albeit in a less systematic fashion and perhaps with less 
intensity and cruelty than during the “dirty wars” against a 
perceived political enemy.  There is now less need to destroy 
cells and organisational structures, and less fear that the victim 
of torture is an intelligent, dedicated revolutionary that knows 
how to  “beat the system” if the torment remains at a bearable 
level. But torture continues to be the shortcut to the clarification 
of crimes, and police interrogators are more interested in 
immediate media-focused results than in successful 
prosecutions with scientifically gathered evidence.181 
Under the rule of Pinochet, tens of thousands of Chilean nationals were tortured 
for the former rather than the latter of reasons mentioned above, mainly to instil 
fear and ensure obedience. Luban also echoes this, claiming that: 
First, there is torture for the purpose of terrorising people into 
submission. Dictators from Hitler to Pinochet to Saddam 
Hussein torture their political prisoners so that their enemies 
would be afraid to oppose them, knowing that they might face a 
fate far worse than death.182   
How relatable is this type of torture to that present in Uzbekistan? A direct 
comparison serves as a useful means by which to identify various 
idiosyncrasies that are common to both ‘regimes’, and also help discover 
whether the reason for Pinochet’s eventual downfall could be applied to the 
case of Uzbekistan.   
Unfortunately, torture in South America is not an isolated problem. In a recent 
report by Amnesty International, Mexico was specifically highlighted in respect 
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of its serious and ongoing torture-related human rights breaches.183 Further, in 
similar vein to Uzbekistan, the attitude towards torture at first glance appears to 
be that of apathy, Amnesty documenting that: 
Reports of torture and other ill-treatment continued to be 
widespread, as was the failure on the part of federal and state 
prosecutors to adequately investigate complaints. 184 
However, more positively and in a move which Uzbekistan could seek to 
replicate, the Mexican Supreme Court improved the situation by making the 
inclusion of torture based evidence more difficult: 
The Supreme Court strengthened legal obligations to exclude 
evidence obtained under torture.185 
This notable improvement aside (and Mexico’s attempts at reform 
acknowledged), the common factor appears to be the state, and more 
specifically, the judiciary of problem states either behaving apathetically towards 
the continuing use of torture, or condoning it through permissive judgments.186 
A number of individual states are, rather than creating fresh anti-torture 
legislation and reinforcing anti-torture safeguards, allowing evidence gathered 
by means of torture to slip through the cracks of what should constitute a fair 
trial. Deficiencies in the legal system itself exasperate the problem. Consider 
the case of this Mexican national, who was imprisoned despite claiming that 
evidence against her had been extracted through the use of torture: 
The Supreme Court’s ruling came in the case of a woman 
sentenced to 25 years in prison for murdering her husband. 
Even though the woman did not ratify her initial confession and 
argued that it was obtained by torture, the first instance judge 
did not start an investigation into this allegation and insisted 
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that the initial medical report did not describe any evidence of 
torture, concluding that the torture allegations were false.187 
It also appears to be the case that in Mexico, attempting to seek justice for 
being the victim of torture and ill-treatment is almost an impossibly difficult task. 
Regardless of large volumes of complaints, very few cases result in a trial and 
conviction of state agents for state–controlled torture. So few, even, that when 
such cases are successful, they become prominent due to their rarity, Amnesty 
reporting that: 
Despite scores of complaints at the federal and state levels, 
there were few prosecutions and almost no convictions of 
public officials responsible…. 
In two exceptional cases the Federal Attorney General’s Office 
dropped charges against the victims of torture after finally 
accepting evidence that they had been tortured in order to 
falsely implicate themselves. The victims had spent between 
three and five years in pre-trial detention.188 
Although such cases were ultimately successful, they were still drawn-out, 
lengthy investigations. A requirement of waiting three to five years whilst in 
detention seems punishment enough (although admittedly, this is entirely 
dependent upon the nature of each offence), regardless of the verdict. 
Another stumbling block which makes the prosecution of torture in Mexico so 
difficult is that ‘torture is a distinct offence under federal law but not under the 
law of all the individual states.’189 Seemingly, such is the seriousness of torture 
that it is not considered something that district courts can handle alone. Torture 
is regarded as a grave offence which is potentially encouraging, but conversely 
it probably means a lot of actual torture goes under the radar due to the 
inherent nature of the court systems. Amnesty exemplifies this, stating that 
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‘Laws against torture exist in Mexico, it’s just that few pay any attention to them, 
and torturers get away with it’.190 
On the other hand, the Mexican government has shown some initiative in recent 
years in terms of giving protection to both human rights defenders (HDRs) and 
journalists in the region documenting human rights abuses. In 2012, it approved 
the Law for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders and Journalists through 
the Mexican Congress. Such a law reduces the capacity for authorities making 
excuses for failing to implement proper human rights protection for such parties, 
who are likely to be crucial in revealing incidences of torture.191 
However, Joloy warns that since 2006, torture, as well as other human rights 
violations, have been on the increase: 
The so-called ‘war against organized crime’, launched by 
President Calderón in December 2006, aggravated the levels of 
violence and insecurity around the country. With it, Mexico has 
also experienced an alarming increase in human rights 
violations in direct relation with the public security strategy 
based on the use of force and militarization. Cases of 
extrajudicial executions, enforced disappearances and torture 
have registered a sustained increase during recent years.192 
The situation is not so bleak in Brazil and Argentina, given their past. Juan E. 
Mendez, who is now the UN Secretary General’s Special Adviser on the 
Prevention of Genocide and President of the International Centre for 
Transitional Justice, was tortured in 1975 by SIPBA193 during the Argentinian 
military dictatorship. As he documents: 
…over the (course of) two days I was transported by car to 
several different places in the suburbs, where I was 
interrogated under beatings and application of the electric prod 
(picana)… 
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The pain I suffered with each discharge was so intense that my 
whole body tensed up; many muscles ached for several days 
after my treatment.194   
 
Mendez’s treatment was typical of political prisoners under the Peron regime in 
Argentina in the 1970s. He goes on to describe the apparent reason for such 
torture: 
When security forces are allowed free reign, as in Argentina in 
the 1970s, they torture not to prevent harm or to gather 
evidence but to develop leads that might guide them in 
destroying the structures of the guerrilla organisations they are 
fighting. This means they will routinely torture every person 
they capture, without regard to guilt or innocence or to their 
significance as potential intelligence yields.195 
This ‘blunderbuss’ approach to torture meant that under Argentinian rule, no 
prisoner could escape this fate, no matter his personal situation. Such an 
indiscriminate approach to torture is perhaps more worrying than more 
traditional methods, i.e. singling out particular persons who are deemed to 
possess knowledge which is of interest to the authorities.   
However, Argentina also appears to now be making up for lost time, specifically 
in terms of its overhauling of human rights protection. Since the Peron regime 
ended, one of the biggest statements to the world community that Argentina 
was serious about changing its ways was its early adoption of the ICC Statute in 
November 2000.  Alvarez comments that: 
Argentina's strong support for the ICC is undoubtedly a 
consequence of its recent history. Barely three decades ago, 
the country was ruled by a military dictatorship which 
systematically repressed its political opponents through 
selective assassinations, forced disappearances and 
widespread torture in clandestine detention centres spread 
across the country. It is not surprising that Argentina has sought 
all possible ways to prevent these events from happening ever 
again. Hence, it signed the ICC Statute on 8 January 1999 and 
adopted the ratification law on 30 November 2000.196 
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This is another encouraging sign; it also serves to show that previously rogue 
states can reform and even lead the way in setting an example to other 
problematic states on how to move forward. 
Brazil had a similar history of torture to Argentina during the 1960s, ‘70s and 
‘80s.  From 1964 to 1985, under military regime and in similar circumstances to 
Argentina and Chile, accounts of gross mistreatment became public. The 
regime was led by five different presidents during its 21 year duration, starting 
with Humberto de Alencar Castelo Branco and ending with Joao Figueiredo. 
Although the situation improved after the regime ended, torture was still 
commonplace in Brazil until in 1996, when the lower house of Congress finally 
accepted the international outlawing of torture, seven years after it had ratified 
the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment in 1989.197   
Brazil has made several significant steps in recent years to close the door on its 
unsavoury past, including the unveiling of a Truth Commission in 2014 by 
former President Dilma Rousseff, who herself was a victim of the mid-to-late 
20th century torture regime. As Phillips documents:198   
The Truth Commission has spent two years and seven months 
compiling its report, which contains harrowing details of tortures 
carried out by the military dictatorship. It detailed beatings, 
electric shocks, sexual violations, and psychological torture on 
people the state saw as a threat. 
The report increased the number of those it said were killed or 
disappeared during the dictatorship to 434, from the previous 
official number of 362. It also named 377 people it said were 
involved in human rights abuses, of whom 196 are still alive. 
The names included deceased former presidents and military 
leaders.199 
A ‘National System to Fight and Prevent Torture’ has also been recently 
introduced, and: 
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Although the System did not fully meet international standards 
in terms of its independence, it represented an important step 
forward in fulfilling the country’s obligations under the Optional 
Protocol to the UN Convention against Torture, which Brazil 
had ratified in 2007.200 
Ploton offers an optimistic view of the future of Argentina’s use of torture, 
explaining that in August 2014, calls were made on the behalf of its 
government, amongst other states, to apply for eligibility for a relatively new 
(2011) fund to support the implementation of the OPCAT:201 
Like its sister fund, the UN Fund for Victims of Torture, the 
OPCAT Special Fund could contribute to bringing human rights 
closer to the ground and provide direct support to a burgeoning 
and vibrant movement of torture prevention actors around the 
world. 
This new treaty, which entered into force in 2006, represents a 
breakthrough in international human rights law, as it requires 
states parties to create, designate or maintain one or more 
national institutions to monitor places of deprivation of liberty. 
That approach differs radically from ‘traditional’ international 
human rights treaties, whose modus operandi is based on a 
more classical cycle of reporting to UN treaty bodies and 
implementation of recommendations formulated by the treaty 
bodies.202 
This breakthrough could radically improve the landscape of torture prevention in 
years to come. Rather than merely recommending states to sign up to a treaty 
or convention, like the ECHR and UDHR,203 the OPCAT is a more active 
system, and points states in the right direction by positively reinforcing their 
need to create or greatly improve existing domestic institutions, which can be 
set up to be uniquely tailored to the state it is responsible for safeguarding. If 
the OPCAT becomes a success in the states it has already been implemented 
into, it could be an approach that could work in respect of Uzbekistan. 
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It is important to note at this stage that Uzbekistan is not yet a signatory of the 
OPCAT 2002,204 nor has it ratified it, despite having ratified the UNCAT 1984205 
in September 1995. If the OPCAT special fund is ever introduced to Uzbekistan, 
any positive impact would be welcomed, not least by the victims of torture within 
its borders. 
Argentina also followed similar steps to Brazil in that by April 2015, its 
‘government regulated the National System for the Prevention of Torture’.206 
However, in a move that mirrors that of Uzbekistan, it has so far failed to create 
a National Committee. ‘The Committee’s functions would include visiting 
detention centres and establishing criteria for the use of force, control of 
overpopulation and transfer regulations’.207 Such criteria would have given 
Argentinian authorities greater understanding of the legal boundaries they 
would be restricted to, and any possible infringement would have been much 
easier to define and prove.   
Lessa also expresses her opinion that despite general improvements regarding 
human rights in Argentina since the end of military rule, torture and murder are 
still commonplace: 
Although there have been significant improvements since 
democratization in the mid-1980s, conditions favouring human 
rights abuses still persist. In particular, specific human rights 
abuses (torture, disappearances, and murder) that resemble 
practices common during the repression under state terrorism 
(1976 to 1983) continue to take place.208 
Argentina’s progress could provide an instructive example which may provide 
useful lessons in respect of Uzbekistan. 
However, Argentina’s approach to the permitting of detention centre visits and 
regular monitoring marks a significant contrast with Uzbekistan’s. Prison visits in 
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Uzbekistan are very rarely allowed,209 and even when they are, ‘while granted 
access to some detention facilities, (foreign diplomats) are usually accompanied 
by prison or law enforcement officials during their visits’.210 When independent 
human rights organisations such as Human Rights Watch attempt to inspect 
Uzbek prisons, they are almost always denied any access whatsoever.211 
Chile also has a long history of torture, one which is arguably more directly 
comparable to Uzbekistan. 
Chile under the rule of Pinochet 
Since the Pinochet regime grudgingly relinquished power in 
1990, Chile, like the rest of the world, has changed profoundly.  
The passage of time has allowed older Chileans to look back 
on the Pinochet regime with greater critical detachment.212 
In June 1974, Augusto Pinochet Ugarte was sworn in as the self-proclaimed 
‘Supreme Chief of the Nation’ of Chile213 following a military coup that previous 
year. This marked the beginning of a 17 year tyrannical dictatorship, now 
renowned for an epidemic of torture, murder and the unexplained 
disappearances of thousands of Chilean nationals.214   
It has already been explained why torture was used so ubiquitously under 
Pinochet’s regime, whilst, as Claude and Weston comment, ‘Pinochet… never 
personally tortured anyone… his control over those who did rendered him liable 
for torture under international law’.215 The purpose of the Pinochet regime’s 
extensive use of torture was to make the Chilean people submit to his will 
through terror and fear, not necessarily to extract vital intelligence or even to 
reveal the plans behind possible separatist revolutionary movements. Torture 
was an extension of his grip on power, and it was effective. During his reign, old 
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airports, barracks, stadia and disused ships were converted into specialised 
torture detention centres, built for the sole purpose of breaking the will of his 
victims.216 
Various examples of the violent methods used by Pinochet’s operatives include: 
simple and violent and continuous blows causing fractures and 
bloodshed, as well as keeping the detainees prostrate on the 
ground or standing, naked under constant light or with the head 
covered by a hood, sprayed upon, partitioned off, or in niches, 
in other words in narrow cubicles in which it was impossible to 
move; denial of food, water, clothing in similar needs; 
suspension by the arms in the air, semi-asphyxiation by water, 
foul-smelling substances and excrement, the application of 
electricity to the testicles, tongue and vagina, systematic rape, 
simulations of shootings and other sophisticated methods of 
torture such as that known as the “pan de arara” which 
consisted of the hanging of the body for a prolonged period.217   
The following diagrams show the detailed mechanics of torture techniques 
Pinochet ordered to be used: 
Diagram 5.1:  
Suspended from 
pole218 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
216
 See Reed Brody and Michael Ratner, The Pinochet Papers: The Case of Augusto Pinochet in Spain and 
Britain (Kluwer Law International 2000) 208. 
217
 ibid 208. 
218Diagƌaŵ ϱ.ϭ: MiĐhael NeuŵaŶŶ, ͚The Cƌiŵes of Augusto PiŶoĐhet͛ 
http://mneumann.tripod.com/pinochet.html accessed 5th September 2016. 
78 
 
Diagram 5.2:  Electrocution to genitals219 
 
 
 
 
Diagram 5.3: Beatings and 
asphyxiation220 
 
These examples of torture 
techniques, as barbaric as they 
are, appear rudimentary and 
almost archaic. Tried and tested 
methods have changed very little 
since the middle ages, so little that 
simply beating someone into submission is often rather effective, at least in 
terms of making the victim bow to your will. As a form of intelligence gathering, 
however, it is highly flawed, as will be discussed in more detail later on in this 
study.   
In order to contextualise and better envisage the kind of torture used inside 
Uzbekistan’s borders, it is useful to compare the techniques used under 
Pinochet’s rule with those used today by the former: 
Beatings:  Survivors report being beaten with hands and fists, 
batons, rubber truncheons, iron rods and water-filled plastic 
bottles, while suspended from ceiling hooks by their hands. 
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Asphyxiation:  This is carried out with plastic bags or gas 
masks places over detainee’s head.  When the gas mask is 
securely fastened, the air supply is turned off until the victim 
loses, or is on the point of losing, consciousness.   
Electric shocks:  Survivors report having electric shocks 
applied to sensitive areas of the body, such as genitals, 
buttocks and breasts, while suspended from a ceiling hook.   
Rape and sexual assault of women and men:  Survivors 
report rape and sexual assault with objects, such as bottles and 
batons, and a group rape of women and men by police officers. 
Deprivation of food and water:  Many former detainees have 
reported that they were not given adequate food or water for up 
to six days in pre-charge custody and/or in pre-trial detention. 
Sleep deprivation:  In general, the light in punishment cells 
and all pre-charge and pre-trial detention cells, most commonly 
a single lightbulb, is never switched off, making it difficult for 
detainees to sleep.221   
These examples of Uzbek torture are just a glimpse of what goes on behind its 
closed doors, but the list is almost identical to the Chilean techniques of the 
1970s. Rape, beatings, asphyxiation, starvation and electric shocks are 
particularly common denominators.222   
Despite this, Chile and Uzbekistan, Pinochet and Karimov, have had no 
intervention by the US. Because Karimov of Uzbekistan provides a certain level 
of stability in the Middle East via his brutal crackdowns on Muslim extremism, 
since 9/11, the US has used Uzbekistan as a marker as to the stability of the 
landscape in that area. As Gupta comments: 
Suharto, Mobutu and Pinochet are the true faces of America’s 
‘promoting democracy’ abroad.  One of the newest recruits to 
this list is the Uzbek president, Islam Karimov.  Washington is 
‘involved in a conspiracy of silence’ over Uzbekistan’s human 
rights record since that country was declared an ally in the ‘war 
on terror’ in 2001.223 
None of this silence from America does anything to help the suppression of 
torture – it is an inconvenient truth that Uzbekistan tortures, yet the US tends to 
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look the other way because of the advantages it has in allying itself with 
Karimov.  
The reality is, at best, the US is not contributing towards reducing the 
prevalence of torture in the Middle East, especially Uzbekistan, and at worst, is 
tacitly supporting it.  When combined with factors such as Guantanamo Bay, it 
puts the US in a particularly bad light when it should be at the forefront of 
providing a global example to opposing torturing. 
As is now evident, both the motives for torture and the techniques used in 
Uzbekistan closely mirror that of Chile. It is also of use to investigate what 
happened after Pinochet’s rule in Chile ended, what relevant, if any, safeguards 
Chile’s legal system and or constitution puts in place to prevent such measures 
from ever happening again, and whether the lessons learned in Chile can be 
applied in the same way to Uzbekistan. Chile’s troubled past is not a perfect fit 
for what is happening to the Uzbek regime, but it is too useful an example to 
ignore.   
Post-Pinochet Chile – Does it Still Torture? 
There is strong evidence to suggest that Chile has been very slow to respond in 
surfacing from its torture-ridden past and wiping the slate clean in terms of 
denouncing and banning its use since Pinochet eventually lost power in 1990.   
In 1995, a UN Special Rapporteur on Torture ‘conducted a mission to Chile 
where he found that recognition of what constituted torture was shaped by the 
practice of the previous regime’.224   
It also appears to be the case that Chile underestimated the scale of what 
needed to be done post-1990 in order to refocus its laws and move on from 
what Pinochet’s practices had once been. A mixture of naivety and grossly 
misjudged assumptions prompted what was to become a very lacklustre 
attempt at torture reform, upon which McGregor comments that: 
The TJ (transitional justice) processes in Chile have not 
resulted in engagement with how the state security apparatus 
functioned under the Pinochet regime or with reform of the 
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security sector. Rather, it may simply have been assumed that 
the combination of the police's resumption of its role as the 
primary organ responsible for law and order and the disbanding 
of the military unit principally responsible for the use of torture 
against political detainees were sufficient to ensure its 
cessation and nonrecurrence. However, UN reports issued 
after the transition point to the continuing influence of the 
Pinochet era on the practice and treatment of alleged cases of 
torture.225 
These revelations are not encouraging. A shift in power and the collapse of a 
tyrannical regime are clearly not guaranteed to make a big enough difference 
when it concerns efforts made towards human rights reforms. The fact that the 
almost three decades since the fall of Pinochet have not been long enough to 
effectively eradicate state-sanctioned torture makes the challenge posed by 
Uzbekistan appear even more daunting.   
Indeed, the 2009 session of the Human Rights Council set out a list of 
recommendations which included those specifically for Uzbekistan, but the 
subject matter of the session itself had been influenced by ‘allegations that 
torture and other ill-treatment continue to be committed by the police’226 in 
Chile. Recommendation numbers 33 and 43 were both aimed at Uzbekistan, 
and were as follows: 
33. Take appropriate measures to prevent torture and to ensure 
that all allegations of torture are properly and independently 
investigated, and ensure that the law adopted to define torture 
is in accordance with article 1 of the Convention against Torture 
(Uzbekistan); 
43. Thoroughly investigate all forms of human rights violations 
particularly of those who were arrested in the course of police 
operations (Uzbekistan). 
Claims and complaints of torture in both Chile and Uzbekistan appear to go 
hand in hand currently. If a theoretical solution to, or at least an alleviation of 
Uzbekistan’s use of torture is to be sought, Chile is not the best model. 
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These are dangerous times for countries like Uzbekistan. When regimes are 
toppled and power vacuums are created as a result, people come to expect the 
change they have longed for, yet they are often disappointed.   
Pinochet is just one example, and the resulting shift in laws and attitudes after 
regime change are highly unpredictable. The best way to determine the value of 
this change is to directly examine Chilean laws before, during and after the 
Pinochet regime, specifically those concerning human rights.   
In the short time before Pinochet violently took power in Chile, a democratically 
elected Marxist, Salvador Allende, became President in the 1970 election. His 
main aims were typically Marxist, most notably to provide support to the poorer 
classes, and introduce widespread nationalisation with regards to the 
economy.227 O’Shaughnessy described him as a ‘country doctor and upstanding 
freemason who was set on introducing elements of social democracy in a 
country long organised for the benefit of the landowners, industrialists and 
money men’.228   
Allende stayed faithful to the-then 1925 Chilean Constitution, which included the 
‘promise to care for the social welfare of all citizens’.229 This was replaced by 
the 1980 Constitution, and work towards it began soon after Pinochet came to 
power in 1973. The 1980 version is still in force today, but has undergone 
several alterations and the elimination of various articles. A new constitution is 
set to be created in 2017, after an announcement by current President Michelle 
Bachelet in October 2015.230 The attention brought to the use of state-torture 
and the level of its illegality remains to be seen. 
The current 1980 constitution in place during Pinochet’s rule does not contain 
any articles which explicitly outlaw the use of torture, or inhuman or degrading 
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treatment. The closest possible matches to this are listed under Chapter III, 
Article 19: Constitutional Rights and Obligations, sections 1 and 7(c):  
S.1 The Constitution guarantees to all persons: 1.- The right to 
life and to the physical and psychological integrity of the 
individual. 
S.7(c) No one may be arrested or detained unless on an order 
of a public official, expressly empowered by law to that effect 
and provided such an order has been served in the manner 
prescribed for by law. However, an individual caught in the act 
of committing a crime may be detained provided that he be 
brought before the competent judge within the following twenty-
four hours. Should the authority order the arrest or detention of 
an individual, the competent judge must be served, within forty-
eight hours following the arrest or detention, and the individual 
is to be brought before him. By virtue of a well-founded 
decision, the judge may extend this period to five days and, in 
instances where the facts under investigation are described by 
the law as terrorist acts, such period may be extended to ten 
days.231 
The basic rules concerning arrest and detainment of suspects are outlined, but 
no specific rules as to the treatment of each suspect are mentioned. As such, 
on a domestic level, Chile does not appear to have a prohibition of torture.  
Instead, Chile ratified the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish 
Torture in 1988,232 and also the UNCAT that same year. The Chilean Penal 
Code of 1874 also contains a definition of torture, but it is one which does not 
currently comply with international standards.233   
To summarise Chile’s development over time concerning its history of torture, 
the laws in place during Pinochet’s rule were insufficient to protect citizens from 
its use, and even now, there is a clear deficiency with its current Constitution, 
which may be one of the reasons why the clamour for a new one has been 
answered.234 But when so few safeguards and legal prohibitions of torture were 
around during the time of Pinochet, it is no surprise that the atrocities committed 
under his rule were indeed carried out. Whether they would have made any 
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difference is debatable, but having them there in the first place is certainly 
preferable. Uzbekistan does have such safeguards in place, both domestically 
and internationally, to no effect.235 Such is its denial that torture is a major issue, 
in July 2015 it ‘rejected allegations of the pervasive use of torture and other ill-
treatment by security forces and prison staff’, and ‘insisted that the 
constitutional prohibition of torture and single mention of it in the Criminal 
Procedure Code conformed to the state’s obligations under the ICCPR’.236 
Using Pinochet’s regime as a model that gives Uzbekistan some sort of 
relatable context, it is clear that even with a far greater volume of statutory 
safeguards, both national and international, its plight is no better than that of 
Chile’s, even given that the former happened several decades ago, and that 
generally, human rights have steadily improved over such a period of time 
(although one of the main reasons for this progress is due to the increased 
implementation of human rights statutes/conventions,237 the very conventions 
which Uzbekistan continues to ignore).   
A strong similarity is also notable between both Chile and Uzbekistan in terms 
of attempted prosecution of state officials for torture crimes in two separate 
cases of extraterritorial jurisdiction. Neither case produced a conviction, but the 
established link is worth discussion.   
The Pinochet case of 1997 concerned Pinochet (who was then no longer the 
dictator of Chile) visiting the UK and receiving surgery in a London hospital. 
After a request by Spanish courts, he was then arrested by British police under 
two arrest warrants relating to the acts of torture and murder he authorised 
whilst Chilean head of state. After a number of appeals and retrials, Pinochet 
was eventually extradited to await further trial in Spain.238 A number of legal 
blocks had to be circumnavigated to achieve this, including the debate over 
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whether he had state immunity as he was the head of state for Chile during the 
time of the crimes.   
Additionally, at the time of the case, Bianchi reveals that: 
…no one stressed that the UK has the obligation under the 
Torture Convention either to extradite General Pinochet to 
Spain or to any other country that has submitted an extradition 
request or to refer the case to its judicial, authorities for 
prosecution in the UK.239 
Unfortunately, Pinochet did not stand trial as he died just a month after being 
put under house arrest and having his state immunity removed, and thus he 
was never convicted for his crimes. However, the mere fact that he was about 
to stand trial is testament to the law; ultimately, he was about to be made to 
answer for offences, albeit after a number of decades. This should cause some 
degree of concern for the leaders of other rogue states, Uzbekistan included. 
Echoing this, in 2005, a former Minister of Internal Affairs of Uzbekistan, 
Zokirjon Almatov, visited Germany to receive medical treatment. Uzbek victims 
of torture authorised by his hand filed complaints against him with the German 
police.240 In December 2005, a complaint made via eight Uzbek officials was 
presented against him on the grounds of him committing acts of torture via the 
use of Uzbek police and security forces during the mid-1990s.241 
The case against Almatov was dropped the following March due to several 
reasons, namely that several of the alleged acts committed by him happened 
before the German International Crimes Code entered into force and also it 
could  not be expected that Almatov would return to Germany, and further 
cooperation by Uzbekistan was not guaranteed.242 However, this is an 
encouraging example of how the past can catch up with those who employ 
torture.   
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Zappala argues that had the case gone ahead, it would have been a major 
stepping stone in addressing the impunity of state officials: 
The Federal Prosecutor should have opened the case and 
started investigations. Subsequently, he should have requested 
the cooperation of Uzbek authorities both for the purpose of 
securing evidence and, if necessary, for the extradition of the 
accused. At that stage he could have informed Uzbek 
authorities that under German law he was entitled to drop the 
case should they decide to prosecute the suspect in 
Uzbekistan. In doing so, he would have fulfilled the task 
assigned to him by the CCAIL. This would have been a major 
contribution to the fight against impunity.243 
It is debatable how much cooperation the Uzbek authorities would have 
provided their German counterparts given that the aim was to convict one of its 
former ministers. Yet, even though it was arguably a missed opportunity, it does 
give hope for a future where the use of torture is convictable anywhere, through 
the use of universal jurisdiction. It also identifies a link between Pinochet’s 
Chile, and today’s Uzbekistan, and could be used as precedent to further 
pressurise for more active prosecution of Uzbek officials. 
It is clear that the aftermath of a deposed tyrannical leadership, or an upheaval 
of old regimes which relied on torture is not a guarantee of a better future for the 
state concerned. Change can be both positive and negative, and in the case of 
torture, the outcomes are not always clear. 
A much closer inspection of the fundamental problems that lie at the heart of 
Uzbekistan is now necessary in order to propose achievable ways in which the 
problems identified can potentially be addressed.   
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Chapter 6 
Uzbekistan’s Ultimatum 
 
It is clear from the discussion contained in previous chapters that, from its use 
in the Middle-Ages through the 20th century, and now in the 21st century, torture 
has taken many forms, has been employed for a variety of purposes, and that 
its practitioners have sought to justify its use on a number of different grounds. 
Several examples of historic regimes, or individual state-sponsored uses of 
torture that have been committed by the state and its agents, have been 
documented and analysed. The fundamental question now is of how the 
lessons derived from these examples can be applied in respect of Uzbekistan’s 
use of torture, and how they can be utilised as a basis for suggesting what 
changes and reforms are necessary in relation to Uzbekistan’s legal provisions 
on torture and their interpretation by the country’s judiciary.  
Several key recommendations need to be given to the Uzbek authorities, using 
the knowledge of what has been learned and formulated from other countries’ 
experiences and past mistakes in a way which has apparent benefits for both 
parties; the international community and Uzbekistan.   
Uzbekistan acknowledges that torture is wrong, otherwise it would not have 
criminalised it244 nor referred to it in the CCRU or COU,245 yet it continues to 
employ it. International criticism clearly has not worked, and so providing 
genuine alternatives which both improve the plight of Uzbek civilians when 
taken into custody by the authorities, yet do not diminish the ability to gather 
intelligence on suspected criminals and serve as a deterrent to other 
prospective outlaws, need to be sought. A ‘bargaining’ type situation may be the 
only way of solving this dilemma. The UK took similar steps with Jordan over 
the Abu Qatada situation. Economic pressures from the UK proved to be 
bringing about significant change in respect of Jordan’s domestic laws on 
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torture and the use of torture evidence in legal proceedings.246  Using a model 
that has had some limited success, like that of Jordan, must surely be one of 
the more viable courses of action. An incentive of some sort may be the elusive 
element at work here. Nevertheless, it must also be appreciated that Jordan is 
not a perfect model, as allegations of torture in Jordan still persist.247 The 
challenge may ultimately result in an acceptance that there is no perfect model 
for Uzbekistan to follow, and no perfect solution, but using several examples of 
progress in the reduction of torture in other states as inspiration appears to be 
the best way forward. 
Despite its use as a tool of terror and information gathering, torture has been 
proven to be a grossly ineffective means of achieving its intended aims.  
Regardless, US President Donald Trump voiced his enthusiasm for using 
torture and enhanced interrogation techniques on terror suspects in January 
2017,248 something which former President Obama denounced and regretfully 
admitted that it was something that the post 9/11 Bush administration secretly 
used in Guantanamo Bay on Al-Qaeda suspects.249   
These are worrying times indeed when the President of the US, a major global 
power and one that so many states look to as an example to follow, is suddenly 
openly announcing its interest in using torture. This example is something that 
may only add to Uzbekistan’s fervour for using torture on its own suspects. 
Nevertheless, O’Mara explicitly outlines the shortcomings of torture asserting 
that: 
[T]orture fails utterly as a means of getting at the truth, even 
more so compared with non-coercive investigative methods. 
The purpose of a modern interrogation is to get reliable, 
replicable and verifiable information. Professional interrogators 
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say torture is the worst possible method for this. Neuroscience 
agrees. Imposing extremes of pain, anxiety, hunger, sleep 
deprivation and the threat of drowning does not enhance 
interrogation. It degrades it… 
A torturer hopes that enough residual function is unaffected so 
that intelligence can be gathered. Instead, people say whatever 
is needed to make the torture stop.250 
Despite this, and in spite of the sheer volume of international and national 
statutes which explicitly ban its use, it appears to be something that, either 
covertly or completely brazenly, states continue to use. 
O’Mara suggests a preferable, and generally rights-compliant, alternative: 
What’s the alternative? It is to talk. Humans like to talk. 
Perhaps 40 per cent of what we say to other people consists of 
self-disclosure… during [it], the brain’s reward system is 
activated.251 
Carefully structured psychological methods of talking may eventually prove to 
be one of the best ways in which torture could be consigned to history as a 
method of extracting intelligence from an individual. Advising countries such as 
Uzbekistan that these newer, more ethical, and perhaps even more effective 
approaches to intel-gathering can surely be worth attempting. O’Mara goes on 
to show that this is not a new practice; conversely, it has been tried, tested and 
shown to yield excellent results when conducted by a trained interrogator with 
the right approach: 
The legendary German interrogator Hanns-Joachim Scharff 
knew this, debriefing more than 500 allied airmen during the 
second world war. He never used coercion, but was incredibly 
well prepared, cross-checking information carefully. He never 
asked a direct question, and never indicated any interest in any 
answer he got. He was adept at taking the pilots’ perspective 
and actively listening. These skills can be learned, and are not 
so different from the skills of a highly trained doctor.252  
Perhaps it is already emerging that a combination of political pressures, 
proposed amendments to current Uzbek legislation, and rights-compliant 
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alternatives to torture as a recommendation are all viable options for stopping or 
at least reducing Uzbekistan’s use of torture. A combination of these 
approaches may be the best way of achieving a breakthrough. 
Before recommendations are made to Uzbekistan, it must firstly be established 
what its own aspirations as a nation are. It needs to be clarified how Uzbekistan 
wants the world to perceive it. Conceivably, it may aim to please the western 
world and show its reliability in providing a buffer protecting the west from 
Islamic terror organisations.253 Alternatively, as a former Soviet state, previous 
Communist frameworks may still be in place that suggest the country still 
identifies and sympathises with its old ties. Indeed, evidence to suggest this 
possibility lies with the fact that its late former President, Islam Karimov, was a 
First Secretary of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan, and went on to rule for 
25 years.254 It needs to be established whether Karimov’s former Communist 
influence dictated the way in which he ruled Uzbekistan, and the direction in 
which he steered it. Establishing Uzbekistan’s political compass and identity 
may give further clues as to what leverage can then be applied to it when 
attempting torture reforms. 
The Aspirations of Uzbekistan 
Historically, Uzbekistan has always been a state having to come to terms with 
several conflicting cultural identities and statuses. For centuries, the country 
was the centre of a ‘cultural cross-roads’.255 Merchants from across both Asia 
and Europe passed through in ancient times, carrying silks and spices from 
India and China through its borders. Naturally, the area was influenced by these 
differing cultures as they made their passage, as Khan explains: 
Over the centuries, Uzbekistan has been a part of many 
empires – Iranian, Greek, Chinese, Arab, Mongol, Turk – and 
its historical influences have contributed to its unique modern 
identity.256 
                                                          
253
Gary K. Bertsch, Caddady Craft, Scott A. Jones and Michael Beck, Crossroads and Conflict: Security and 
Foreign Policy in the Caucasus and Central Asia (Routledge 2000) 85. 
254
 Mary Lee Knowlton, Cultures of the World: Uzbekistan (Marshall Cavendish International Private Ltd 
2006) 38. 
255
 Aisha Khan, A Historical Atlas of Uzbekistan (The Rosen Publishing Group Inc. 2003) 7. 
256
 ibid 7. 
91 
 
This distinctive history helped to forge a country with a colourful past, yet by the 
late 1800s, Russian forces subjugated areas of the state. Leading up to the 
Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, Uzbek nationals became dissatisfied with their 
Russian occupiers and staged revolts. After the Revolution, Bolshevik leaders 
took control, and leading up to World War II, Russification took hold in terms of 
cultural and language policies. By 1940, the Cyrillic alphabet replaced Latin and 
Stalin’s purges of the 1930s involved the removal of almost all Uzbek national 
leaders, mostly through execution. World War II generated greater 
industrialisation for the war effort on behalf of the USSR, and also an influx of 
western Russian refugees.257  
After the war, Islam Karimov, who at the time was First Secretary for the 
Communist Party of Uzbekistan, introduced extreme policy change to the 
country, including reforms to bring back a sense of Uzbek nationalism and a 
rejection of the former Sovietisation. Examples include conciliatory attitudes 
towards Islam and a shift back towards traditional Uzbek language. The country 
gradually retained more of its powers and regional control through the latter half 
of the 20th century.258  
By 1990, Karimov had taken a lead in the national government, and was 
subsequently elected President of Uzbekistan in March of the same year. 
Uzbek was reinstated as the official language and Uzbek culture revival was 
encouraged. On 31 August 1989, the state was declared independent from the 
USSR and officially renamed the Republic of Uzbekistan. Back then, the cultural 
direction of Uzbekistan was clear – its citizens wanted to retake control of their 
own identity, demonstrated in an independence vote which stood at 98.2% in 
favour.259 By 1992, Uzbekistan had joined the UN, demonstrating its intention to 
be recognised as a sovereign state with intentions to create meaningful 
international relations.260 
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On the face of it, since the start of Karimov’s rule, Uzbekistan has been trying to 
reject its past oppression under the control of the red flag. In relation to state-
related torture, this is somewhat encouraging, given the fact that the USSR 
does not have a good history with torture itself. As Boulesbaa explains, when 
the UNCAT was first drafted, the USSR disagreed with the distinction between 
torture and inhuman/degrading treatment: 
Others were in favour of the wording of the paragraph with its 
inclusion of the concept of ‘cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment’. The former USSR held the former 
position; the US and Swiss government held the latter. The 
former USSR argued that the concept of ‘torture’ and that of 
‘cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’, should 
be treated as legally distinct.  
The USSR held the view that having punishment as an institution was justifiable 
and a multilateral agreement between many states, and that applying such 
punishment to lawbreakers was commonplace, not just unique to them. As 
Boulesbaa explains: 
In the former USSR’s opinion, the Convention required a clear 
distinction between punishments that can be justly applied to 
offenders and forms of treatment or punishment which, 
because of their cruel, inhuman or particularly degrading 
nature, cannot be applied. The former USSR objected to the 
paragraph on the premise that there are no criteria by which the 
concept can be defined.261  
Using torture as a form of punishment was clearly something the former USSR 
was keen to hold on to, and hints at the likelihood of mass uses of torture within 
its borders. If Karimov was keen to reject USSR culture, then torture was 
apparently one such part of the old regime which was to stay. Furthermore, 
global examples which Uzbekistan may look to today for direction on where to 
go next with regard to human rights in general are arguably not helping the 
situation. Already, President Trump and his eagerness to restart a state-
sponsored torture programme has been mentioned, and in November 2016, 
President Putin of Russia removed his signature from the jurisdiction of the 
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International Criminal Court after calls were made for the Russian military to be 
held accountable for air strikes made in Syria in support of President Assad.262 
This is an appalling example for Uzbekistan to follow, as it simply sends out the 
message that, if you are caught committing war crimes or crimes against 
humanity (torture is classified as such), then you can remove yourself from any 
legislation or tribunal under or by means of which sanctions may be imposed. In 
essence, states need only take heed of law which they want to obey.  
It seems relatively clear that Uzbekistan does not want to shift back to its USSR 
past, yet the negative influence of Putin may still be used as an excuse for 
future uses of torture and maltreatment of Uzbek nationals. The autocratic 
nature of Karimov may, however, suggest otherwise. The media, for example, is 
heavily restricted. Anti-torture publicity along with other human rights related 
issues are therefore subject to intense governmental vetting, and most likely 
never reach their intended audience (unless in a censored form). As Richter 
explains: 
Despite [the] collapse of the communist party and the socialist 
empire, state media continue to dominate in most of the post-
Soviet countries… 
In Uzbekistan, for example, the state and its ministries and 
agencies are the founders and financiers of over 70 per cent of 
the print media. (T)hese media supply pre-packaged and one-
sided coverage and exclude anything that might paint the state 
and senior officials in an unflattering light.  
(The) performance of the government ‘is covered selectively 
and in a mostly positive tone.263 
 
Again, none of this is helpful to the cause of eliminating torture inside the 
country. Since taking power in 1990, Karimov has taken on his role in ruthless 
authoritarian fashion, and a state system which rejects democracy and freedom 
of speech is notoriously hard to break down to bring positive reform.264 Melvin 
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documents four key areas of reform that Karimov put in place after his election 
victory: 
First, the creation of a single system of power based around the 
institution of the presidency and person of Islam Karimov. 
Second, a set of initiatives designed to forge a strong 
centralised state and to assert Tashkent’s control over the 
regions. Third, the Uzbekistani leadership has promoted Uzbek 
nationalism as a means to unite society. Fourth, the 
government has been careful to supress the development of all 
potential supporters of opposition, particularly Islam… 
[T]hese policies have produced a highly authoritarian regime 
hinged upon the almost unlimited powers of the president. 
President Karimov has made ruthless use of the security forces 
to crush opposition and the media are tightly controlled by the 
state.265 
This model of power is highly dangerous to Uzbek citizens, especially to those 
who disagree with Karimov’s style of rule. Yet, despite the similarities with 
USSR rule, it does not seem that Karimov’s Uzbekistan wishes to re-join a 
Soviet-style pact in the 21st century. Uzbekistan has been an independent 
sovereign state since 1989, and there are no indications that it wishes to 
regress on that front. Rather, the modern-day Uzbekistan appears keen to 
enhance its reputation as its own state, whilst improving relations with 
surrounding Middle Eastern states, notably Kazakhstan. At the same time, it 
also appears to be shadily keeping on friendly terms with the US with regards to 
its treatment of terror suspects. Danilovich and Insebayeva illustrate this: 
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have been competing for regional 
influence since their independence in 1991. In the late 1990s, 
Uzbekistan seemed to be ahead of its neighbour in this 
competition, significantly, thanks to its cordial relationship with 
the United States. Later, Kazakhstan took the lead and has 
continued to impress the region and the world by its economic 
reform and performance. Notwithstanding their regional 
ambitions, the two countries have maintained friendly bilateral 
relations and the two leaders, Nursultan Nazarbayev and Islam 
Karimov, have always demonstrated mutual respect.266 
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Further enforcing its reputation as a ‘crossroads state’, Uzbekistan is 
geographically neighboured by states with a reputation for home-grown terror 
organisations (including Pakistan and Afghanistan both of which have strong 
ties with Al-Qaeda) and it also has its own home-grown radical Islamist 
organisation, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, which is influenced by both 
the Islamic State (IS or Daesh) and Al-Qaeda.267  
Herein lies the main source of suspects who are, in turn, subjected to the Uzbek 
torture system before extradition. Damilovich and Insebayeva provide more 
detail on this: 
Uzbek authorities actively request extradition of Uzbek asylum 
seekers in the name of national security and the 'war on terror'. 
They argue that Uzbek asylum seekers belong to banned 
Islamic movements and organize and participate in terrorist 
acts in Uzbekistan.268 
Since May 2005, Uzbek authorities have been even more emphatic in their 
attempts to crack down on supposed Islamist terrorists. It is often the case that 
officials make major security concerns known to the public to aid the process of 
seeking out those attached to Islamist groups or supporters of Islamists who are 
particularly opposed to the government. Danilovich and Insebayeva again 
explain: 
When authorities manage to get them back to Uzbekistan, the 
returnees are held in incommunicado detention where the risk 
of being tortured or ill-treated is very high. In recent years, 
many cases of forcible return or extradition have been 
documented by Amnesty International, who also report torture, 
and unfair trials resulting in death sentences.269 
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Strengthening of Current Uzbek Laws 
One of the ways in which torture could be reduced in Uzbekistan has already 
been discussed in this chapter; through offering a genuine alternative to torture 
by way of advanced psychological talking techniques, and using subtle clues to 
make the suspect being ‘interrogated’ feel in control of the situation. In order for 
this alternative to work, interrogators in Uzbekistan would have to be re-trained 
and taught how to use newer questioning techniques, whilst perhaps greater 
investment in specialist body monitoring equipment could indicate clues as to 
when the suspect feels open to reveal vital intelligence (ECGs, sweat level 
monitors, polygraphs for example.).270 It could even be suggested that western 
states offer their expertise in return for commitments. 
Another such route could be to propose a restructuring of the current legislation 
Uzbekistan already has in place to combat torture. Whilst the relevant 
safeguards in Uzbek legislation which specifically deal with the topic of torture 
have already been discussed in chapter 3 of this thesis, they need to be 
considered in further detail if they are to be theoretically developed to decrease 
their levels of permeability.  
To reiterate, there are currently two main areas of Uzbek law which prohibit the 
use of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment in relation to suspects under 
state police custody; the national Constitution, and the Criminal Code. Under 
the COU,271 Article 26 of Chapter 7 outlines: ‘No one may be subject to torture, 
violence, other cruel or humiliating human dignity treatment’.272 The prohibition 
is clear – the word torture is used, in conjunction with ‘humiliating human dignity 
treatment’, which can be interpreted as having roughly the same legal meaning 
as ‘inhuman or degrading treatment’, which is the standard set in both the 
UNDHR and ECHR.  
Similarly, Article 17 of the CCRU 1994273states: 
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Nobody may be subject to violence, torture, or other cruel or 
degrading treatment. 
Acts or decisions, which degrade dignity, violate privacy, 
endanger health, and cause unjustified physical or moral 
suffering, shall be strictly prohibited.274 
Paragraph 1 of this prohibition is again very similar to the international laws on 
torture, and this almost duplicates those laws to the letter. Paragraph 2, 
however, goes into surprisingly close detail, even to the extent proscribing 
‘moral suffering’, something which is neither defined nor protected in other 
international conventions. It is ironic that a state with such a poor history of 
torture has arguably some of the most meticulous wording in its laws which are 
meant to prevent the practice from being carried out. 
It also needs to be established why national Uzbek laws have such poor 
records of enforceability, and whether it is possible to improve such levels. 
Another bewildering move by Karimov came in 2011, when he approved new 
laws which supposedly gave even more protection to those in police custody. 
President Karimov permitted a new law to be passed in September 2011, which 
involved improving the levels of police access to suspects in pre-trial custody, 
as well as easing the process of independent monitoring. The new law also 
allowed for lawyers and family members of suspects to have unrestricted 
access to custody centres, and the steps required to be granted such access 
were reduced in number.275 
It is becoming apparent that there are no real flaws with Uzbek legal provision 
itself; rather, the levels of enforceability, particularly from the judiciary, are the 
main areas of concern. As Amnesty report: 
[J]udges rarely exercise their discretionary power to draw to the 
prosecutor’s attention any evidence that torture may have 
occurred or that a confession or other testimony may be tainted 
by torture…  
[J]udges rarely admit challenges to the admissibility of evidence 
on the grounds that it was extracted under torture. This failure, 
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like the failure to respect other safeguards against torture, 
reflects the central role that torture plays in the Uzbekistani 
criminal justice system. Torture is not an occasional, tolerated 
aberration in Uzbekistan. It is an essential tool for the extraction 
of confessions, upon which convictions frequently depend.276  
Nevertheless, such is the problem that torture has become in the country, its 
significance arguably warrants the attention of its own, independently tailored 
torture statute. 
One of the overriding issues with relevant laws regarding torture, whether 
international or national, is that they often appear to be somewhat vague and 
subjective. In Ireland v UK,277 the ECtHR was inexperienced at ruling on 
accusations of torture, and as such, the threshold to uphold a conviction was 
set very high, the Court ruling that the ‘five techniques’ employed by British 
troops on Irish nationals, constituted inhuman treatment but not torture. The 
Court, when ruling on Article 3, voted by 16 to 1 that the use of the 5 
interrogation techniques amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment, which 
constituted a breach. It also ruled by 13 to 4 that the use of the 5 techniques 
were not severe enough to constitute a practice of torture within the scope of 
Article 3.278 
The ECtHR even went on to express its own opinion that the fifth of the five 
techniques, the deprivation of food and drink, did not constitute torture within 
the scope of Article 3, despite agreeing that the others did. The Court then held 
by 14 votes to 3 that the ‘last-mentioned practice was not one of torture within 
the meaning of Article 3’.279 
Despite the ruling in Ireland arguably being outdated in certain respects and the 
threshold on torture having been lowered since the 1970s, the point remains 
that a certain stigma still comes attached to torture, and that, perhaps even if 
unintended, a level of subjective-ness still remains. Physical torture appears 
easy to envisage, but levels of severity are subjectively different for each 
person, notably in relation to both the torturer (how much coercion should be 
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applied?) and the tortured (how painful does this coercion feel?); such 
comparisons oneself are ineffective, as each individual is different and has their 
own threshold for pain and mental anguish. Conceivably, the phrasing of torture 
laws helps to perpetuate this trend. Rumney furthers this notion, commenting on 
Bagaric and Clarke he observes that: 
Bagaric and Clarke argue that: ‘[t]here is no bright line that can 
be drawn concerning the point at which the “torture threshold” 
should be set’ and recognise that this creates a significant 
degree of imprecision.280 
Rumney then goes on to explain the dangers of vaguely-worded torture laws, 
noting that: 
Vague wording… may increase the possibility that extraneous 
factors (such as fear or animosity), will influence the decision-
making… [I]t is inevitable that a torture law would be the 
subject of litigation, as any statutory language is likely to give 
rise to competing interpretations. This may lead to further delay 
or uncertainty.281 
Therefore, it is advisable if a new torture statute for Uzbekistan were to be 
drafted, in an ideal world, it should be as clear as possible for all, including both 
the public using it as a defence, and the judiciary using it as a guide for their 
own decision making. The law on torture should be detailed explicitly, and there 
should not be too much distinction between torture and other ‘softer’ words 
which suggest treatment less than that of torture, such as inhuman, degrading 
and immoral. There should be no sliding scale, simply a clear-cut ruling that any 
form of torture is illegal. The statute should be entrenched and enshrined into 
Uzbek national law, and placed as one of the fundamental rights of man.  
However, it is of course recognisable that much of this is unattainable in reality, 
and nothing is as simple as suggested here. The scope of such a statute would 
need to be very clear. The conclusion to this thesis will clarify the realities of the 
steps Uzbekistan now needs to take, as these ideas are admittedly very 
optimistic goals. 
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The Role of Judges 
Uzbek judges may be advised to use appropriate aids to direct their decision 
making, for example, using Foley’s manual on torture as guidance on how they 
should treat cases of torture and how to recognise both the national and 
international significance of the laws on torture. The role of evidence should 
also be treated with extreme care, as evidence obtained by torture should be 
struck out immediately. Foley asserts that: 
The basic role of judges is to uphold national law – including 
international law when this has been incorporated into domestic 
legislation – and to preside independently and impartially over 
the administration of justice.282 
Foley also states that the responsibility of ensuring defendants, witnesses and 
victims are treated fairly also resides with the judiciary and that defendants must 
always receive a fair trial. Rights must be continuously respected in full, and 
inadmissible evidence should be struck out as soon as possible.283 Foley 
continues by saying that: 
Judges should at all times be alert to the possibility that 
defendants and witnesses may have been subject to torture or 
other ill-treatment. If, for example, a detainee alleges that he or 
she has been ill-treated when brought before a judge at the end 
of a period of police custody, it is incumbent upon the judge to 
record the allegation in writing, immediately order a forensic 
medical examination and take all necessary steps to ensure the 
allegation is fully investigated.284 
Perhaps most importantly, Uzbek judges must be reminded at all times of the 
universal jurisdiction that applies to torture. Foley continues by stating: 
While legal systems vary in some respects in different parts of 
the world, the legal prohibition of torture is universal. The 
primary role of judges in preventing acts of torture, therefore, is 
to ensure that the law is upheld at all times.285 
In addition to the advice given to the judiciary of Uzbekistan, it is also advisable 
that the national court system and the proceedings during a trial are altered so 
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as to give greater parity between prosecutors and defendants. As the current 
situation stands, Uzbek prosecutors are given numerous advantages, 
(disregarding the bias of judges towards admitting torture tainted evidence and 
eagerness to convict terror suspects) including psychological cues such as 
placing the defendant in a cage during his/her trial, giving the impression that 
they are already a convict and are guilty until proven innocent. This is observed 
by Berg, who also accounts for other scenarios in the courtroom which do not 
favour the defendant: 
Defendants in criminal hearings in Uzbekistan, as in other 
countries in the region, are held in cages guarded by either 
police men in uniform or soldiers in camouflage, creating an 
environment not conducive to the presumption of innocence… 
defendants are not allowed to talk to their lawyers during the 
trial… In general, courts are laid out in a way that lawyers sit 
with their back to the defendants making even eye contact 
impossible.286 
Additionally, Berg also sheds light on an example where a national judge 
unequivocally ignored the claim that evidence presented was obtained by 
torture during the trial of suspected terrorists: 
[I]n 2006, Human Rights Watch monitored two group trials of 
alleged religious extremists where the defendants testified that 
they had been subjected to torture. In neither case did the 
judges start an investigation nor did they exclude the testimony 
alleged to have been obtained by torture. 
For example, Judge Shermukhamedov of the Tashkent 
Province Court asked defendant Mansur Kholikov about his 
torture allegations and showed him a report from the 
investigation period… 
Kholikov: No, when I signed this protocol there was neither a 
lawyer nor an investigator there, only operantivniki. 
Judge: The operantivniki do not have the right to conduct an 
interrogation. 
Kholikov: But they forced me. 
Judge: This was not an interrogation but an explanatory 
meeting. Did you tell your lawyer about the beatings? 
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Kholikov: I did not have confidential meetings [with my 
lawyer]… There was no point in telling my lawyer about the 
beatings. He was going to leave and I had to stay there.287 
These revelations expose a deep fault line running through the centre of 
Uzbekistan’s judiciary, police and criminal justice system, and since national 
judges are appointed by the President,288 there is little hope for change unless a 
political change takes place. The President appointing judges is not necessarily 
a problem in itself, but issues arise concerning the type of tenure and how easy 
it is to dismiss them or take away certain privileges, such as pensions.  
Fresh hopes for this, however, arose in September 2016 when it was 
announced that President Karimov had died of a brain haemorrhage.289 
Although it is too early to predict whether this development will bring about 
significant change for the plight of Uzbek nationals and for the state of human 
rights in the country, the appointment of former Prime Minister Shavkat 
Mirziyoyev as the new President290 could signify some variation in the region, as 
the Karimov era came to an abrupt end after over two and a half decades of 
control.291  
The task at hand now is to draw up a substantive list of recommendations for 
Uzbekistan, and draw conclusions on how the background on torture, taking 
into account all examples of past regimes and the various justifications for its 
use, give substantive clues as to what direction Uzbekistan takes from here. 
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Chapter 7 
Conclusions and Recommendations  
 
It can be concluded, based on the foregoing analysis, that torture is a crime that 
has, is, and unfortunately most likely always will be, committed in certain states, 
by certain authorities for several differing reasons. It is also a crime with 
differing definitional issues, given that it can be classed as a general 
international crime, a crime against humanity and also a war crime. 
Several examples of historic regimes of torture have been highlighted,292 as 
have the steps taken in an attempt to either reduce or completely eliminate the 
use of torture in such states. The challenge now is to consolidate those lessons 
and use them to inform a series of recommendations aimed at Uzbekistan with 
the underlying aim that they can influence or help bring about the change in 
attitude needed to improve the treatment that Uzbek citizens, suspects and 
prisoners have become accustomed to at the hands of their own government 
and other state authorities. 
It must be noted, however, that whilst further domestic legal prohibitions, 
economic and political pressures from other states, and the examples provided 
by ‘model leaders’ - both individually and combined - offer potential catalysts for 
change, completely eradicating torture in a state where its use is so entrenched 
may be a near impossible task. The reality is that there is no perfect example to 
follow, as has already been illustrated in this thesis. Indeed, few states have 
truly clean hands, even the likes of the UK,293 other western European states,294 
and the USA,295 given its history with regards to Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo Bay 
and the worrying aspirations of President Trump with regard to the treatment of 
terror suspects.  
Given, therefore, that there is no ‘silver bullet’ for reliably eliminating the use of 
all forms of torture in Uzbekistan, the next best thing is perhaps to use lessons 
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from the past in combination with these economic and political pressures and 
further domestic laws in order to determine progress. In addition, new 
technology could be used to monitor and track state officials. 
Before these recommendations are listed, however, the landscape on torture as 
a whole needs summarising.  
The use of, and purported rationales for, torture have evolved over time, from its 
earliest establishment as a tool for punishment and assertion of state power and 
authority, to the modern day usage as an illegal method of gathering 
intelligence from suspects. 
Some of the earliest documented uses of torture and the reasons behind them 
are not indistinguishable from Uzbekistan’s intentions today. Uzbekistan has 
framed the use of torture within its borders so that the laws render it unclear 
when the use of physical and psychological coercion is a permissible tool of law 
enforcement and when such practices constitute prohibited acts of torture. 
Human Rights Watch, for example, have noted that ‘torture continues to be a 
practice endemic to the criminal justice system’ and is ‘ignored and overlooked 
by investigators, prosecutors, judges, and sometimes lawyers, and generally 
hushed up by the media and the government’.296 
To compare this with what torture was used for in Germany during the Middle-
Ages, there are similarities in terms of using it as a means of keeping order 
amongst the citizens of the state and instilling a sense of ‘justice’. Stokes, 
Plummer and Barnes identify that: 
The earliest traces of torture in Germany are found in urban 
communities such as Cologne and Freiburg. The cities’ struggle 
to establish and defend a degree of sovereignty resulted in 
some of the earliest German legal documents referring 
explicitly to torture: fourteenth-century imperial privileges 
granted to the cities that testify to their right to use torture in 
criminal trials.297 
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This indicates that although torture comes in many forms, its fundamental 
justifications have barely changed in certain states that continue to employ its 
use, and so it can be suggested that Uzbekistan is using medieval practices in 
order to both control and limit the freedoms of its citizens.  
In terms of suggestions regarding how to move forward and provide feasible 
remedies to the situation on Uzbekistan, one area which is clearly in dire need 
of reform is the level of access that non-Uzbek monitoring bodies are afforded 
when visiting the country, most notably state officials and the representatives of 
various international human rights NGOs.  
Currently, there are no structured prison monitoring systems in place for 
outsiders, and this ‘shutdown’ on visiting is applicable to all Uzbek places of 
detention. As a result of this, very few people see first-hand what exactly is 
happening to Uzbek suspects; how extensive the levels of torture are, and the 
deplorable treatment that so many of those who are illegally detained are 
subjected to. The relatively sparse accounts that have filtered out of Uzbekistan 
have come from survivors of torture, those who have fled the country, and the 
relatives of those who are being processed by the system. As Amnesty 
International confirm: 
Uzbekistan has no independent monitoring mechanisms in 
place to inspect all places of detention. Due to government-
imposed restrictions, no independent non-governmental 
organisations, domestic or international, carry out any form of 
regular, un announced and unsupervised prison monitoring… 
Foreign diplomats, while granted access to some detention 
facilities, are usually accompanied by prison or law 
enforcement officials during their visit. The same applies to 
human right defenders who have on rare occasions been 
allowed to visit imprisoned colleagues.298 
It has also been revealed that in November 2014, Human Rights Watch sent a 
delegation to review the Uzbek prison system, but their requests were denied 
by the authorities.299 
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If the situation, however bleak currently, is to improve, then Uzbek officials must 
be seen to be making a genuine and concerted effort to reform and allow 
regular visits, the results of which should show gradual improvements over time 
with possibly national incentives after each successful appointment, perhaps in 
the form of beneficial international trade deals or praise in international forums, 
such as the UN, for example.  
Another key area to investigate in the future is the role of Uzbek judges and the 
levels of impartiality amongst the judiciary. Concerning reports coming out of 
the country by NGOs have demonstrated that criminal verdicts are heavily 
weighted towards the prosecution,300 and, as has been discussed in Chapter 6 
of this thesis, the levels of enforceability of Uzbek laws on torture currently 
leave much to be desired. One possible solution to this could be some of the 
work of the OSCE,301 of which Uzbekistan is a member. The ‘Fight against 
Torture’ manual302 ‘is a handbook for practitioners that assembles the OSCE's 
experience in torture prevention work and identifies best practices and 
strategies’.303 Its section dedicated to the prevention of torture in Central Asia, 
which encompasses the area of Uzbekistan amongst other states, suggests 
means of improvement: 
Additionally, some field operations in Central Asia have 
directed their efforts towards other activities considered viable. 
Examples include providing financial support for or organizing 
public meetings to discuss torture and ill-treatment within the 
context of detention monitoring and criminal justice reform in 
general, providing information to international treaty monitoring 
bodies, and training and supporting other organizations 
politically.304 
In conjunction with the OSCE handbook, the Istanbul Protocol 2009305 may also 
provide assistance. This guide delivers instructions on how to document the use 
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of torture, the response to torture in certain areas including The Maldives, 
considerations to be made when gathering evidence of torture, forms of ill-
treatment leading to physical and psychological manifestations of torture, and 
also information for the role of prosecutors, judges and the police in cases of 
torture. Again, this guidance may be invaluable, particularly for Uzbek judges 
and prosecutors in need of clarification of what systems should be followed in 
torture cases. 
There is, however, some hope. According to the UN, over the past 9 years 
several reforms to the judiciary have been made. Habeas corpus was 
introduced in 2008, and decrees relating to ‘improvement of court activity’306 
and ‘radical improvement of social protection of the judicial system 
employees’307 were passed in 2012. Whilst encouraging, these reforms do not 
fully address the questions which still surround judges in cases regarding the 
use of evidence obtained by torture, or why conviction rates remain abnormally 
high. There remains an unhealthy connection between the supposedly 
independent judiciary and the controlling executive. As a paper commissioned 
by the ICCPR308 observes: 
Uzbekistan’s judiciary is de jure independent from but de facto 
subordinate to the executive branch of government. Formally, 
the judges are elected by the Senate, the upper chamber of 
parliament. But in reality, the appointment of judges is under 
strict control of the presidential administration and may be 
dismissed from their posts at the request of this administration. 
As a result, judges following orders from the executive branch 
of power cast a blind eye on complaints of torture.309 
It appears that because of this level of control from the executive, Uzbek judges’ 
main concerns are the prospect of instant dismissal if there were to be a decline 
in conviction rates, and so the pressure of job security often sadly comes before 
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justice. An overhaul of this system must be initiated if progress is to be made, 
because the current situation is untenable and effectively undermines what a 
judiciary should be; independent and fair.  
When all of these factors are taken into account, they indicate a growing sense 
that none of the potential reforms to the Uzbek system will work on their own. It 
is becoming clear that a wide-ranging approach is necessary if there is to be 
any chance of improving the plight of the citizens of Uzbekistan having their 
human rights regularly suppressed. If there is to be a time where Uzbeks can 
live in a society where they are not afraid of speaking out, or having peace of 
mind that they are not to be arrested for alleged terror offences despite a lack of 
evidence, but that such evidence miraculously appears when tortured in the 
confines of a police station (which in turn is used as the main line of argument 
for the prosecution in court), then the fault-lines within the system need to be 
addressed on several fronts. 
Therefore, a list of recommendations is to be made in reference to Uzbek 
authorities: 
Recommendations to the Government of Uzbekistan: 
Short-term 
1. Sign and ratify the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture 
and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. This 
will help further the notion that Uzbekistan is serious about torture reform 
and provide further safeguards for prisoners. This is likely achievable 
because signing a convention is a relatively straightforward process, and 
Uzbekistan has willingly signed similar documents in the past including 
the 1984 UNCAT.310  
Likely achievable 
 
2. Adhere to national laws which explicitly ban torture, with particular 
reference to Articles 24, 25 and 26 of the Constitution, Article 235 of the 
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Penal Code and Article 17 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Additionally, 
recognition should be made of Article 6 of the supranational ICCPR 
which guarantees the right to life. This is possibly achievable on the one 
hand, because the laws are national and do not require any lengthy 
integration into Uzbek law. However, conversely, the chances of serious 
adherence are not so great given past experiences. At present, 
Uzbekistan has regarded its own anti-torture laws as essentially 
worthless legislation and has carried out repeated flagrant breaches.311 
Additionally, it needs to be considered that realistically, extra funding for 
resources and training would need to be generated; it is currently 
unknown how this would be achieved. 
Possibly achievable 
 
Medium-term 
3 Agree to incentives offered by other countries in return for annual 
reductions in the levels of torture conducted in prisons,312 and aim to 
genuinely want to reform the way in which prisoners are treated behind 
closed doors. This is more likely achievable, based on past examples. 
Jordan agreed to similar incentives given by the UK in the Abu-Qatada 
case.313 Additionally, external pressures are more likely to invoke a 
response from Uzbekistan than simple criticisms, as they have an active 
rather than passive effect. A recent change in the head of state is also a 
positive development, and offers opportunity for change. 
Likely achievable 
 
4 Routinely retrain and re-educate Uzbek police and prison officers in order 
to make clear the current legislation regarding torture, and regularly 
assess the type and lawfulness of the custodial treatment such officers 
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are administering to suspects. Any officer who falls below the threshold 
of humane treatment should be threatened with dismissal.  
This is less realistically achievable. The actual requirements for re-
training state officials should not be too complex or require any 
particularly exceptional skills, yet the chances of Uzbekistan agreeing to 
such a change in the way it carries out such processes are far less likely. 
The funding required for re-training could also be an issue. 
Currently less realistically achievable 
 
5 Allow foreign parties, including governmental dignitaries from other 
states, human rights defenders and representatives from NGOs regular 
access to prison facilities without being shadowed and the right to 
interview prisoners in private. This is unfortunately less than realistic, 
given that Uzbekistan up until now has repeatedly rejected missionary 
inspections and has effectively administered a closed door policy to most 
foreign institutes, even to media organisations. However, there has been 
some encouraging news recently in that the BBC, which had been 
banned from Uzbekistan since October 2005 re-opened its office in the 
country in July 2017, indicating a potential thaw in relations between 
Uzbekistan and the world media.314 Whilst currently less likely a 
recommendation, this could perhaps change over the coming years 
given the changeable dynamics of Uzbekistan’s new President. 
Currently less realistically achievable 
 
6 The UN Special Rapporteur on Torture should be freely invited to the 
country to observe the mechanisms behind Uzbekistan’s custodial 
systems. Again, this is unlikely, given Uzbekistan’s resistance to foreign 
‘interference’. Human Rights Watch stated in their most recent world 
report on this matter, that: 
Since 2002, the government has ignored requests by at least 
14 UN rights experts to visit the country. In September, the UN 
high commissioner for human rights singled out Uzbekistan in a 
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list of country that failed to cooperate with his office for having 
refused access to the country.315 
 
Currently less realistically achievable 
 
7 Victims of torture should be allowed to speak out about their ill-treatment 
without fear of oppression or further torture, and complaints from these 
individuals should be dealt with extremely seriously. A tribunal 
specifically for the victims of torture by Uzbek authorities should be set 
up in order to seek justice and compensation, and punishment for the 
perpetrators, perhaps in the form of a truth and reconciliation committee.  
Since Uzbekistan is reluctant to admit its hand in torture and propose 
change, agreeing for this recommendation to happen would require 
admission of guilt or at least some wrongdoing on behalf of the Uzbek 
government, something which currently seems unattainable.  
Currently less realistically achievable 
 
8 Any situation whereby torture is deemed to have been used in a national 
court as evidence should be struck out, or where necessary, retrials 
should be arranged where it is obvious that the defendant has been 
tortured before giving evidence. A new law should be implemented 
explicitly outlawing the admissibility of torture-tainted evidence.  
Since the Uzbek judiciary is currently being heavily influenced by the 
executive,316 either a significant split between the two would need to 
happen before this recommendation could take effect, or just as 
importantly, a change in stance of the executive, neither of which look 
like plausible routes as of yet. 
Currently less realistically achievable 
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Long-term 
9 Overhaul the way in which the judiciary operates, including the process 
of selecting judges, so as to promote greater disconnection between the 
judiciary and the executive. Judges should not be dismissed based on 
unfavourable conviction statistics gathered by the government; there 
should be complete independence between the two. Again, this is 
unfortunately a purely speculative recommendation, and would require 
greater separation between the executive and judiciary before any 
progress could be made. This is a requirement for change that the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has 
singled out in particular.317 
Currently less realistically achievable 
 
10 Should these points fail, or be deemed ineffective in addressing the 
problem, early steps should be taken by the Uzbek government to draft a 
new national torture statute which amalgamates all provisions from 
existing national and international constitutional, conventional and 
chartered provisions which it is already subject to, with new additions to 
be made where necessary to strengthen the new law(s). This would not 
be too complex a task, but would once more require the Uzbek 
government to acknowledge that it tortures, and also that its current anti-
torture legislation is inadequate, something which currently looks 
unfeasible until a change in attitude is considered. 
Currently less realistically achievable  
Final Conclusions 
Many of these recommendations are admittedly optimistic, and can be criticised 
themselves in their own right. The aspirational tone should be acknowledged 
and considered alongside the context. However, they nevertheless highlight the 
extent of the situation Uzbekistan currently faces in its illegal use of torture. The 
reality of the situation is that torture has been, and will be, used, not just in 
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Uzbekistan but in other states for the foreseeable future. Currently, torture is 
recognised as a crime within international law, yet unlike other crimes against 
humanity which it is often drafted into the same bracket as, it is often 
overlooked in favour of condemning only the most despicable acts. In the Rome 
Statute, the founding treaty of the ICC,318 torture is listed as such with other 
crimes, but comes after murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation and 
imprisonment/deprivation of liberty.319  
So, despite the definition of torture transcending several international statutes, 
treaties and charters, and being defined under several different headings, the 
attitude of global powers towards it seems to be mixed; some indicate a degree 
of indifference, whilst others robustly adhere to the laws against it. It is already 
clear that the Bush administration greatly misused its powers to torture inmates 
at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay, yet US use of torture stretches far beyond 
that. As Miller comments: 
…America’s intelligence agencies began a history of physical 
and mental torture that was present in Vietnam during the 
Vietnam War (i.e. the Phoenix Programme), in Central America 
during the 1980s, and in the Middle East since 2001 (i.e. Abu 
Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay). The recent revelations of the 
extraordinary rendition program and the secret overseas 
prisons run by the CIA affirm the continued involvement of the 
CIA in torture.320  
These international attitudes towards torture underlie one of the major issues 
with torture; apathy. It is almost impossible to set a benchmark for a state like 
Uzbekistan to follow when countries which should be leading by example and 
paving the way for human rights reform continually break international laws in 
order to satisfy their own agendas.  
It is therefore evident that in order to improve Uzbekistan’s plight, there must be 
efforts made on several levels, internally and externally. Uzbekistan must 
drastically improve its own legal system and the independence of its judiciary, 
limit the scope of the President’s powers, and refresh its modus operandi 
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towards in order to reduce torture in the region. On the other hand, external 
pressures from other states must be more forceful, and sanctions for 
Uzbekistan’s failure to improve its human rights records must be harsher. 
Uzbekistan must be given a reason to stop torturing, because without an 
incentive, it has no reason to stop, given the support it gains from the US in 
stabilising the threat from terrorism in the East and given the level of control the 
Executive has over its citizens. It is simply not enough to hope that the Uzbek 
government will suddenly have a change of heart and realise that what it has 
been doing is morally wrong.  
Ultimately, the battle against torture may never truly end. In the 21st century, 
wherever there is the opportunity to extract information from a suspect who is 
alleged to possess vital intelligence, especially when time is of the essence, 
torture seems like the cheap, effective and necessary solution. It is also a crutch 
to fall back on by dictators in need of spreading fear and instilling discipline and 
order. It is a tool of terror, which whilst often brutally effective in the short-term, 
can never be justified as an appropriate means of controlling the population. 
Perhaps one day there can be optimism of looking towards a future where its 
use is halted for good. 
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